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ABSTRACT
The United States has been plagued with a deadlocked, "do
nothing" Congress for the last several years, but today there is a new
game in town. Senator Chris Dodd declared, when he first
encountered the full force of e-legislating, "It's a new day [in
Washington] . . . . Brace yourselves."' Digital technologies have

fundamentally changed the relationship of citizens to their
governments. Since e-democracy was first identified in the 1990s, at
least four subcategories have emerged. This article debuts the newest
member of the e-democracy family: e-legislating-the use of the
Internet and social media to influence federal legislation.
The federal legislative process has traditionally been remote for the
average citizen. E-legislating attempts to change that dynamic
through the use of electronic media campaigns to influence legislators
between election cycles. Yet, fundamental problems with the process
exist and were illustrated by the use of e-legislating to protest the Stop
Online Piracy Act (SOPA) in January 2012. One negative outcome
was manipulation of the public through emotional, multi-sensory
messages that may have resulted in impulse-based decision-making.
Another was a lack of accountability for the citizens who
anonymously contacted legislators to influence their votes or who
submitted multiple electronic messages regarding the Act. In addition,
the SOPA Internet blackout raised a troubling, but perhaps unique
concern: SOPA opponents were able to use deprivation to coerce
political action. Participating websites deprived citizens of their

IJonathan

Weisman, In Fight Over Piracy Bills, New Economy Rises Against Old,

N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/19/technology/web-protests
-piracy-bill-and-2-key-senators-change-course.html?pagewanted=all&j-O.
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services and were able to divert the users' newfound time into
activism in favor of the SOPA opponents.
E-legislating has awe-inspiring potential to empower common
citizens and to result in the creation of positive laws that reflect a
balance of the will of common citizens with the influence of lobbyists
in Congress. However, citizens participating in e-legislating need to
be aware that the process can be both obstructive as well as
constructive.
INTRODUCTION

O

Khaled Mohamed Said
twenty-eight-year-old
6, 2010,
June
nwas
savagely
beaten
to death by two officers of Egypt's secret
police. Two days later, the "Kullena Khaled Said" Facebook page was
launched with the message, "We Are All Khaled." 2 That webpage
gave birth to "Revolution 2.0,"3 which then went on to achieve
something previously considered impossible: it changed the
leadership of Egypt after thirty years of dominance by Hosni
Mubarak.'
The United States is experiencing a similar, if less bloody, Internetbased revolution. On November 6, 2012, the Presidential campaign
for Barack Obama rallied voters with a powerful online presence.
Project Narwhal, as it was called, was a sophisticated data platform
that gave the Obama campaign an edge in its ability to socially
connect with,. and then mobilize, Obama supporters to get to the
polls.5 "Narwhal unified what Obama for America knew about voters,
2 WAEL GHONIM, REVOLUTION
THE PEOPLE IN POWER: A MEMOIR
3 GHONIM, supra note 2.

2.0: THE POWER
59-60 (2012).

OF THE PEOPLE IS GREATER THAN

4 Mubarak, the fourth president of Egypt who served from 1981 to 2011, was ousted
after 18 days of coordinated demonstrations in January and February of 2011. On February
11, 2011, Vice President Omar Suleiman announced that Mubarak had resigned as
president and transferred authority to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. David D.
Kirkpatrick et al., Egypt Erupts in Jubilationas Mubarak Steps Down, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.

11, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/12/world/middleeast/12egypt.html. Ghonim
and other Internet activists set the ball rolling with a call to hundreds of thousands of
Egyptians to "take to the streets" on January 25, 2011. GHONIM, supra note 2, at 139.
China, recognizing the potential threats from electronic media organizing, allows "vitriolic
criticism" on the Internet but actively censors "[any attempt to [motivate] collective
action." Shankar Vedantam, It's OK to Protest in China, Just don't March (Sept. 9, 2013),

http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2013/09/09/219721983/its-ok-to-protest-in
-china-just-dont-march.
5 Alexis C. Madrigal, When the Nerds Go Marching In, ATLANTIC, Nov. 16, 2012,
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/1 1/when-the-nerds-go-marching-in
/265325/.
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canvassers, event-goers, and phone-bankers, and it did it in real
time." 6 The Romney campaign's answer to Narwhal, Project Orca (its
name chosen because orcas are the only known predators of
narwhals), crashed on Election Day.7 "Mr. Obama's information
technology infrastructure was viewed as state-of-the-art exemplary,
whereas everyone* from Republican volunteers to Silicon Valley
journalists have criticized . . . Mr. Romney's get-out-the-vote
application,

. . .

widely viewed as having failed on Election Day

Highly sophisticated, technologically-assisted activism campaigns
now target government and private actors on a daily basis and have
fundamentally altered the way many decisions are being made. 9 The
ouster of Mubarak in Egypt' 0 and President Obama's reelection
illustrate one key area of e-democracy"-the powerful role of the
6 Madrigal, supra note 5.
7 Nate Silver, In Silicon Valley, Technology Talent Gap Threatens G.O.P. Campaigns,

N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2012, http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/l 1/28/in
-silicon-valley-technology-talent-gap-threatens-g-o-p-campaigns/.
8 Silver, supra note 7.

9 Social media campaigns target both public and private actors. For example,
Change.org states, "With hundreds of people winning campaigns on Change.org, the pace
of change is growing unbelievably quickly. Have something you want to change? Click
here to start your own petition-and we bet you'll find that you're more powerful than you
ever imagined." The GroundHog, Our Voice Still Matters, GROUNDUP (Feb. 15, 2012),
'The
site has
http://groundupct.wordpress.com/2012/02/15/our-voice-still-matters/.
collected millions of petition signatures spanning a vast array of topics.
10 Revolution 2.0 was successful in ousting Hosni Mubarak. Whether Egypt can
become a successful and peaceful democracy remains to be seen as unrest continues, such
as the November 2012 riots in response to Morsi's power grab. See, e.g., David D.
Kirkpatrick, Morsi Defends Wide Authority as Turmoil Rises in Egypt, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.

6, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/07/world/middleeastlegypt-islamists-secular
-opponents-clashes.html?pagewanted=all. But some argue we need to be patient because
"democracy in some parts of the world doesn't look anything like ours." Greg Dobbs,
Dobbs: We're Witnessing the Passage to Democracy in Egypt, DENVER POST (Feb. 1,

http://www.denverpost.com/opinion/ci_22493067/dobbs-were
12:01
AM),
2013,
-witnessing-passage-democracy-egypt.
11E-democracy has been defined as "the use of [electronic] information and
communication technologies to engage citizens, support the democratic decision-making
processes and strengthen representative democracy." Ann Macintosh, CharacterizingEParticipation in Policy-Making, in Proceedings of the 37th Hawaii International

Conference on System Sciences 1-2 (2004), available at http://unpanl.un.org/intradoc
/groups/public/documents/un-dpadm/unpan038449.pdf.
E-democracy is distinguishable from e-government, which refers to "[t]he delivery of
online public services." William H. Dutton & Malcolm Peltu, Oxford Internet Inst.,
Reconfiguring Government-Public Engagements: Enhancing the Communicative Power
of Citizens 1, 8 (2007), available at http://people.oii.ox.ac.uk/dutton/wp-content/uploads
/2007/04/FD9.pdf.
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Internet in choosing leaders. Other e-democracy processes have been
discussed in the literature.12 This article, for the first time, identifies
and focuses on another form of e-democracy that is just now
emerging: "e-legislating."1 3
In his second inaugural address, President Obama noted:
You and I, as citizens, have the power to set this country's course.
You and I, as citizens, have the obligation to shape the debates of
our time-not only with the votes we cast, but with the voices we
lift in defense of our most ancient values and enduring ideals. 14
The message is not new. Many democratic leaders have opined that
they cannot make change without the support of the people. For
example, Franklin Delano Roosevelt is famously credited with saying,
"I agree with you, I want to do it, now make me do it."15 Obama
supporters have been frustrated by his inability to implement the
change his campaign promised. However, our legislative process
requires action not just from the executive branch, but from Congress
as well, to enact laws. And sadly, the 112th Congress has gained the
dubious reputation of being "the most unproductive session since the

12 See discussion infra Part I.B.

13 This Article applies the "e-legislating" label for the phenomenon described here. The
term has not been otherwise adopted within e-democracy 'discussions. However, the
European Union (EU) has recognized a similar phenomenon which they label
"eParticipation." A 2010 report describes the process as actions by the European
Parliament to "enhanc[e] the participation of citizens and contribut[e] to better legislation
and policy-making." Thanassis Chrissafis & Mechthild Rohen, European eParticipation
Developments, 2

EJOURNAL

EDEMOCRACY

& OPEN

Gov'T

89,

91

(2010),

www.jedem.org/article/download/44/35. This process is being initiated through formal
actions by the EU government, and thus is distinguishable from e-democracy, which is an
effort from the grassroots up. Other authors are also advocating citizen participation in
policy-making in the EU-a concept closer to e-democracy as applied here in the U.S.
context. See, e.g., Paul Johnston, Transforming Government's Policy-Making Processes, 2
EJOURNAL EDEMOCRACY & OPEN Gov'T 162 (2010), http://www.jedem.org/article/view

/43/44 (arguing for more sustained citizen engagement in the policy process); Giinther
Schefbeck, Electronic Support for the Legislative Consultation Process: Theoretical
Concepts and Practical Requirements, 2 EJOURNAL EDEMOCRACY & OPEN Gov'T 28

(2010), http://www.jedem.org/article/view/20 (suggesting new electronic tools could
facilitate citizen involvement).
14 Barack Obama, President of the United States, 2013 Inaugural Address (Jan. 21,
2013), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/21
/transcript-president-obama-2013-inaugural-address/.
15 Tim Price, Keeping Them Honest: What PoliticiansSay vs. What We Make Them Do,

NEXT NEW DEAL (Apr. 25, 2012), http://www.nextnewdeal.net/price-point/keeping-them
-honest-what-politicians-say-vs-what-we-make-them-do.
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1940s."16 As a long-time believer in the power of community
organizing, President Obama has adopted an electronic community
answer to Congress's inaction: e-legislating. In a message to his
followers the day he renewed his oath of office, President Obama
explicitly stated how he hopes citizens will exert their powerthrough "Organizing for Action," a continuation of his election
campaign Internet presence to organize "our grassroots movement" to
impact legislation that "will be crucial to finishing what we started."' 7
Through the "Organizing for Action" website, President Obama
also distinguished citizen roles in elections as opposed to that role in
legislating: "Winning an election won't bring about the change we
seek. It's simply the chance to make that change." 18 His words
emphasize that, even at the highest levels of government, those who
have gained power are now asking people to join in this new type of
e-democracy to "make them" enact transformative laws through elegislating.
This Article identifies and critiques the phenomenon of elegislating. Part I provides the backstory of e-democracy-how it is
viewed and how it has been used in contexts other than legislating.
Part II sets out what e-legislating is and how citizen input in this
context is distinct from traditional law-making processes in the
United States. In Part III, the five key attributes of e-legislating will
be explored, and Part IV will illustrate how these attributes played out
in a recent e-legislating situation. The conclusion highlights the
promise and potential for abuse unleashed by this newest tool for
shaping our democracy.
,I
E-DEMOCRACY

The United States, and the world, is at a flexpoint. The expansion
of glectronic communication, especially social networking and
interactive media,19 is fundamentally changing the relationship of
16 Amanda Terkel, 112th Congress Set To Become Most Unproductive Since 1940s,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 28, 2012, 8:00 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/28
/congress-unproductiven_2371387.html.
'7 E-mail from Barack Obama, President of the United States, to author (Jan. 21, 2013,
06:15 PM MST) (on file with author).
18 Video: Michele Obama on Organizing for Action: You In?, https://my.barackobama
.com/page/s/organizing-for-action (last visited June 30, 2013).
19 The Internet has no monolithic form. This Article focuses on the overall phenomenon
of electronic communication rather than any particular platform. Consequently, the
references here are meant to embrace all forms of electronic communication, active and
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people to their governments. "[The] government no longer has a
monopoly on creating systems for citizen participation. Individuals
and groups are realizing their own online communicative power to
reconfigure their engagements with government and enhance their
capacity to work with others on issues of common interest."20
E-democracy has been defined as the "use of information and
communications technologies and strategies by 'democratic sectors'
within the political processes." 2 1 As the concept of e-democracy has
evolved over time, recognizable subcategories have emerged.
Specifically, for purposes of this article, we will address eelectioneering, e-government, e-rulemaking, and e-judicial advocacy.
But first, a discussion of the backstory is necessary.
A. The Internet
The story of the Internet starts our story of e-democracy. The
World Wide Web was invented in 1990, and user participation in
viewing websites and exchanging email grew dramatically in the
22
following decades. At first, people.saw the potential of the Internet
to widely disseminate information and to expedite personal
communications through email. Soon, however, the Internet's
interactive potential began to unfold.
The introduction of social media such as Facebook in 200423 and
Twitter in 200624 brought the communicative powers of the Internet
to a higher level with the ability to rapidly reach a mind-numbing
25
number of followers. This second, more interactive phase is known
passive, including e-mail, social networking (e.g., Facebook), user-generated content (e.g.,
YouTube or blogs), mash-ups (e.g., Overmixter), citizen journalism (e.g., OhMyNews),
information searching and retrieval (e.g., Google, Yahoo, Bing), or collaborative
production (e.g., Wikipedia). Some have labeled these "Web 2.0 application types."
DUTTON & PELTU, supra note 11, at 6.
20 DUTTON & PELTU, supra note 11, at 8-9.

21 Steven Clift, E-Democracy, E-Governance and Public Net-Work, PUBLICUS.NET
(Sept. 2003), http://www.publicus.net/articIes/edempublicnetwork.htm.
22 See K.G. COFFMAN & A.M. ODLYZKO, AT&T LABS-RES., GROWTH OF THE
INTERNET (2001), available at http://www.dtc.umn.edul-odlyzko/doc/oft.internet.growth
.pdf, ASA BRIGGS & PETER BURKE, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE MEDIA: FROM
GUTENBERG TO THE INTERNET (3d ed. 2010).
23 Danah M. Boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and
Scholarship, 13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 210, 212 (2008).
24 Boyd & Ellison, supra note 23, at 212.
25 In early 2013, President Obama had over 21 million followers on Twitter, and Justin
Bieber had 29 million. Leslie A. Gordon, A Huge Following? Twitter Suit Accuses
Businesses ofSelling Followers, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1, 2013, at 10.
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as Web 2.0.26 With this 2.0 labeling, Silicon Valley suggested it was
just "a new version of some old software." 2 7 But Web 2.0's ability to
bring "together the small contributions of millions of people and
mak[e] them matter ... [is] really a revolution." 28
It wasn't long before scholars recognized that e-democracy had the
potential to dramatically change the face of democracy worldwide.
Initially, scholars found the "bottom-up style of the Internet" to be
"unqualifiedly praiseworthy." 29 But about a decade after its inception,
a "second generation of scholarship on the Internet" became more
critical and encouraged regulation. One of the leading voices for
regulation was Cass Sunstein in his book Republic.com. Sunstein
was especially concerned with the negative impact of the Internet on
democracy and free speech. 32 Yet, the role of social media continues
to grow in our society, and it is unlikely that any significant
restrictions will be placed upon the Internet's ability to provide a
political soapbox for all.
As with citizen initiatives, discussed in Part II.C below, that genie
is out of the bottle,3 3 and no one anticipates a reversal. For example,
an increasing number of Americans are using the Internet to interact
with government. A 2010 study found that eighty-two percent of
American Internet users (representing sixty-one percent of all adults
in the country) accessed or received government services online.34
26 Lev Grossman, You-Yes, You-Are TIME's Person of the Year, TIME, Dec. 25,
2006,

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,15708 10,00.html.
27 Grossman, supra note 26.
28 Grossman, supra note 26.
29 Thomas S. Ulen, Democracy on the Line: A Review of Republic.com by Cass

Sunstein, 2001 U. ILL. J.L. TECH & POL'Y 317, 318 (2001) (book review) (citing David
Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L.

REv. 1367 (1996)).
30 Ulen, supra note 29, at 318.
31 CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM (Princeton Univ. Press 2001).

32 Sunstein suggested reforms to address the ability of the Internet to filter information
and to create "cybercascades" of like-minded thinkers. In his subsequent book,
REPUBLIC.COM 2.0, Sunstein further documents the "information cocoons" and "echo
chambers" he fears have enflamed hate groups. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0

(Princeton Univ. Press 2009). In both books, Sunstein proposes reforms to recognize the
positive potential of the Internet on deliberative democracy. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM,
supranote 31; SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0, supra.
33 K.K. DuVivier, Out of the Bottle: The Genie of Direct Democracy, 70 ALB. L. REv.

1045 (2007).
34 Aaron Smith, Government Online: The Internet Gives Citizens New Paths to
Government Services and Information, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT 2, 10

(Apr. 27, 2010), http://pewIntemet.org/Reports/2010/Goverrnent-Online.aspx [hereinafter
Government Online].
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Nearly a quarter of those went "online to communicate directly with
governinent agencies and participate in the online debate over
government issues and policies."3 5
A 2012 study reinforced the notion of the social network as "the
new public square" 36 when it reported that sixty-six percent of
Americans who use social media, such as Facebook and Twitter,--or
thirty-nine percent of all American adults-have used those sites for
civic or political activities. 3 7 "Minds are not changed in streets and
parks as they once were. To an increasing degree, the more significant
interchanges of ideas and shaping of public consciousness occur in
mass and electronic media."3 8 The question now is what the impacts
will be.
B. Forms ofE-democracy
At least four subsets of e-democracy have emerged since its early
stages: e-electioneering, e-government, e-rulemaking, and e-judicial
advocacy. While social media groups now solicit citizen input during
each of these stages, such input is arguably more appropriate at one
end of the spectrum-i.e., voting in elections-and less appropriate at
the other-i.e., attempting to allow citizen opinion to influence the
objective legal basis for a judicial decision.
First, "e-electioneering," or the role of digital technologies in
39
electing politicians, is illustrated by the Obama campaign story

35 Government Online, supra note 34, at 31.
36 Bill Sherman, Your Mayor, Your "Friend": Public Officials, Social Networking, and
the Unmapped New PublicSquare, 31 PACE L. REv. 95, 102-03 (2011).

37 Lee Rainie, Aaron Smith, Kay Lehman Schlozman, Henry Brady & Sidney Verba,
Social Media and Political Engagement, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT 2

(Oct. 19, 2012), http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2012/Political-engagement.aspx;

see also

Lee Rainie & Aaron Smith, Politics on Social Networking Sites, PEW INTERNET &
AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT (Sept. 4, 2012), http://pewintemet.org/Reports/2012/Politics-on

-SNS.aspx.
38 Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 802-03
(1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring); cf United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 737 (1990)
(Kennedy, J., concurring). But see United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 206
(2003) (citing Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998))
(rejecting the view that traditional public forum status extends beyond its historic
confines).

39 See, e.g., Jim Macnamara & Gail Kenning, E-electioneering 2010: Trends in Social
Media Use in Australian Political Communication, ACADEMIA.EDU (2011),
http://www.academia.edu/830297/E-electioneering_2010_Trendsin-SocialMediaUse
Austl. Ctr. for Pub. Commc'n, EinAustralianPoliticaLCommunication;
Electioneering: Use of New Media in the 2007 Australiaz Federal Election, UNIV. OF
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above. As our democracy envisions and demands active citizen
participation at the voting stage, the use of electronic mediums to
promote election activities was a logical first stage for e-democracy.
Second, the term "e-government" has been employed to describe
the use of electronic resources in delivering government services,
primarily in the realm of administrative agencies. The Electronic
Government Act of 200240 created security standards and uniform
confidentiality safeguards for information technology activities by
federal agencies. In his signing statement, President George W. Bush
stated, "The Act will also assist in expanding the use of the Internet
and computer resources in order to deliver Government services ...
for a citizen-centered,
results-oriented, and market-based
Government." 4 1 The goals of the Act include:
Promot[ing] [the] use of the Internet and other information
technologies to provide increased opportunities for citizen
participation in Government[;]
Mak[ing] the Federal
accountablef;] [and]

Government

more

transparent

and

Provid[ing] enhanced access to Government information and
services ... 42
As budgets allowed, states also have embraced Internet and
computer resources. Similar to the federal use of e-government, the
states' goals initially were for one-way communication of information
from a government to its citizens.4 3 Early evaluations confirm that
these sites have primarily been used to provide information rather
than for promoting debate or shaping policy. 4 4

TECH. SYDNEY (2008), http://www.fass.uts.edu.au/communication/centres/acpc/docs/eelectioneering-research-report-online.pdf
40 Electronic Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899 (2002).
41 George

W.

Bush,

Presidential Statement,

E-Gov,

http://georgewbush-

whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/egov/g-3-statement.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2013).
42 Electronic Government Act § 2(b)(2), (9), (11).
43 See, e.g., Clift, supra note 21 (using the term "representative e-government" to
"describe the e-democracy activities of government institutions"). Clift urges use of
electronic mediums to increase consultation online and increase accountability, and
transparency. His explanation talks of shifting from a traditional model of (1) occasional
input from citizens between elections; (2) power in the governance infrastructure centered
with political leaders who determine broad policy priorities; and (3) government directly
or through publicly-funded organizations implementing the policy agenda and law.
44 Paul Ferber, Franz Foltz & Rudy Pugliese, Cyberdemocracy and Online Politics: A
New Model of Interactivity, 27 BULL. SCI., TECH & SoC'Y 391 (2007), available at

http://bst.sagepub.com/content/27/5/391.abstract.
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The third is "e-rulemaking," the subset of e-democracy that has
perhaps received the most scholarly attention.45 The "notice and
comment" process in administrative rulemaking anticipates and
mandates public input. Some have argued that rulemaking represents
our government's "most transparent and participatory decisionmaking process,"4 promising to "enlarge significantly a genuine
public sphere in which individual citizens participate directly" in
governmental decision-making.4 7 Furthermore, a 2008 ABA report
concluded that "comment activity on regulations.gov has been
increasing at a very encouraging rate."4 8
However, tensions have arisen about appropriate agency responses
to public input through the e-rulemaking process. As an example, in
2003, the National Park Service finalized a rule allowing the use ofjet
skis in two limited areas of the Assateague National Seashore.4 9
45 See David Schlosberg et al., Deliberation in E-Rulemaking? The Problem of Mass
Participation,in ONLINE DELIBERATION: DESIGN, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 133 (Todd
Davies & Seeta Pefia Gangadharan eds., 2009); COMMITTEE ON THE STATUS AND FUTURE
OF FEDERAL E-RULEMAKING, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ACHIEVING THE
POTENTIAL: THE FUTURE OF FEDERAL E-RULEMAKING (A REPORT TO CONGRESS AND

THE PRESIDENT) (2008), available at http://ceri.law.cornell.edu/documents/report-web
-version.pdf [hereinafter ABA E-RULEMAKING REPORT]; Stuart Minor Benjamin,
EvaluatingE-Rulemaking: Public Participationand Political Institutions, 55 DUKE L.J.
893 (2006); Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and
Future, 55 DUKE L.J. 943 (2006); Mariano-Florentino Cu611ar, Rethinking Regulatory
Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411 (2005); Cynthia R. Farina, Mary Newhart & Josiah
Heidt, Rulemaking vs. Democracy: Judging and Nudging Public Participation That
Counts, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 123 (2012) [hereinafter Rulemaking vs.
Democracy]; Cynthia R. Farina et al., Rulemaking 2.0, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 395 (2011);
Cynthia R. Farina et al., Rulemaking in 140 Characters or Less: Social Networking and
PublicParticipationin Rulemaking, 31 PACE L. REV. 382 (2011) [hereinafter Rulemaking
in 140 Characters]; Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Transformation of the U.S. Rulemaking
Process-for Better or Worse, 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 469 (2008) [hereinafter
Transformation];Nina A. Mendelson, Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of Email, 79
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1343 (2011); Beth Simone Noveck, The Electronic Revolution in
Rulemaking, 53 EMORY L.J. 433 (2004); Peter M. Shane, Turning Gold into EPG: Lessons
from Low-Tech Democratic Experimentalism for Electronic Rulemaking and Other
Ventures in Cyberdemocracy, 1 I/S J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 147 (2005); Stuart W.
Shulman, The Case Against Mass E-mails: Perverse Incentives and Low Quality Public
Participationin U.S. FederalRulemaking, 1 POL'Y & INTERNET 23, 29, apps. C, E, G, K
(2009)); Stuart W. Shulman, Whither Deliberation?Mass E-Mail Campaigns and U.S.
Regulatory Rulemaking, 3 T. E-Gov'T 41 (2006); Stephen Zavestoski, Stuart W. Shulman
& David Schlosberg, Democracy and the Environment on the Internet: Electronic Citizen
Participationin Regulatory Rulemaking, 31 SCI., TECH., & HUM. VALUES 383 (2006).
46 Farina, Rulemaking 2.0, supra note 45, at 402.
47 Shane, supra note 45, at 148.
48 ABA E-RULEMAKING REPORT, supra note 45, at 13.
49 Assateague Island National Seashore, Personal Watercraft Use, 68 Fed. Reg. 32,371,
32,372 (May 30, 2003).
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During the comment period, the Park Service received 7600
comments on the proposed rule. Only 170 of those comments favored
allowing the jet skis. Over ninety-five percent (7264 comments)
supported a complete ban on jet skis in the area.so In spite of the vast
proportion of comments supporting a ban; the Park Service passed the
rule anyway.5 ' The agency specifically addressed eight public
comments, but did not incorporate any suggested changes into the
final rule.52
Was the Park Service obligated to take into account the majority's
opposition to allowing jet skis, which was expressed by so many of
the public comments? What was the point of soliciting these public
comments if the agency ignored the input? Should the agency
response be different in an administrative e-rulemaking context where
the goal is informed and objective decision-making? How does this
context differ from the voice of the people in the e-electioneering
context, which legitimizes every citizen's vote regardless of the
motivation or lack of education about the candidates or their
positions? Part III below will flush out these issues further and make a
case for treating citizen input through e-legislating somewhere
between e-electioneering and e-rulemaking participation.
"E-judicial advocacy" is the last alternative subcategory of edemocracy identified here. In a society that is accustomed to
weighing in electronically on just about everything, from which
contestants will win on American Idol or Dancing with the Starss" to
which Thanksgiving turkeys the President should pardon each year, 54
it is not surprising that Americans are now seeking to use edemocracy to influence judicial decisions.

50 Id.
5' Id.

52 Mendelson, supra note 45, at 1364 (concluding that the agency did not address any
of the comments in opposition). Mendelson included this and other stories as evidence that
agencies do not consider "value-based" input. Id.
53 Daniel Blake, American Idol 2012 Winner is Phillip Phillips After Record 132M
Votes, THE CHRISTIAN POST (May 23, 2012, 10:01 PM), http://global.christianpost.com
/news/american-idol-2012-winner-is-phillip-phillips-after-record-1 32-million-votes-754
59/; Gayle Falkenthal, Winner of the 2012 Dancing with the Stars All-Stars Mirror Ball
Trophy Is.

. . ,

WASH. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2012, http://communities.washingtontimes.com

/neighborhood/tv-den/2012/nov/27/winner-2012-dancing-stars-champion-melissa-won/.
54 Megan Slack, President Obama Pardons Cobbler, the National Thanksgiving
Turkey, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Nov. 21, 2012, 4:00 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov
/blog/2012/11/21/president-obama-pardons-cobbler-national-thanksgiving-turkey.
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American citizens and interest groups sought to influence the
Court's 2012 health care decision.5 5 One hundred and thirty-six
organizations, an unofficial record, filed amicus briefs with the
Court.56 Many other advocates sought to convey their opinions about
the health care law in less official ways, such as rallies on the
courthouse steps,s? rants on cable news, 58 open letters to the Court,59
and even regular mail to the Supreme Court.60 However, the largest
campaigns were those driven by social media.
Interest groups used the Internet to rally both Obamacare
supporters and opponents to contact the Justices. The petitions they
compiled and delivered attempted to persuade Justices Thomas and
Kagan to recuse themselves from hearing the health care case. Over
100,000 petition signatures were submitted to Justice Thomas and
61
95,000 to Justice Kagan.
Other groups tried to influence the decision itself. One such group,
FreedomWorks, claims to have gathered over 200,000 online
55 Nat'1 Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
56 Greg Stohr, Record Number of Amicus Briefs Filed in Health Care Cases,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 15, 2012, 10:55PM), http://go.bloomberg.com/health-care-supreme
-court/2012-03-15/record-number-of-amicus-briefs-filed-in-health-care-cases/. This record
number reflects the extraordinary public interest in the health care decision, but is also
consistent with the historical trend of increasing use of amicus briefs. From 1946 to 1955,
amicus briefs were filed in twenty-three percent of argued cases. By the 2011-2012 term,
that number rose to ninety-five percent. Anthony J. Franze & R. Reeves Anderson, The
Supreme Court's Reliance on Amicus Curiae in the 2011-12 Term, NAT'L L.J., (Sept. 24,
2012), available at http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/Arnold&Porter
LLP.TheNationalLawJournal.092412.pdf.
57 Ian Duncan, Supporters, Opponents Rally Outside Court Before HealthcareRuling,
ORLANDO SENTINEL (June 28, 2012, 9:59 AM), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2012

-06-28/news/la-pn-supporters-opponents-congregate-outside-court-as-healthcare-ruling
-nears-20120628_1_healthcare-law-oral-arguments-demonstrators.
58 E.g., Sean Hannity, Health Care Reform is "The Most Irresponsible Piece of
Domestic Legislation in Our Lifetime" (Fox News television broadcast Mar. 21, 2010),
http://mediamatters.org/video/2010/03/2 1/hannity-health-care-reform-is-the-most-irrespon
/162009.
59 E.g., Jen Sorensen, An Open Letter to the Supreme Court About Health Insurance,
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (June 1, 2012), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/cartoons/2012

/june/open-letter-to-supreme-court-cartoon.aspx.
60 Contact Us, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov

/contact/contactus.aspx (last visited July 6, 2013). The Justices do not have email
addresses at which the public can reach them.
61 Mike Sacks, Clarence Thomas Petitioned By 100,000 Progressives to Recuse
Himself from Health Care Cases, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 17, 2012, 12:27 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/17/clarence-thomas-petition-recuse-health-care
n_1284610.html; Tell Elena Kagan: "Recuse Yourself from ObamaCare Court Case,"
GRASSFIRE NATION, (last visited July 6, 2013), http://www.grassfire.com/161/petition.asp.
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signatures for a health care repeal petition that it delivered to the
62
Supreme Court after the close of oral arguments. The group implied
that, thanks to widespread support of its members, it was on the verge
of persuading Justice Kennedy to strike down the law.63
Justice Kennedy did indeed vote against the Constitutionality of the
healthcare law, though no evidence exists to support a theory that he
was at all moved by petitions or other public pressure. 64 The lack of
hard evidence on the efficacy of lobbying judges, however, has not
stopped people from attempting to use social media to control judicial
outcomes. 65
The experiences with each of these alternative forms of edemocracy provide guidance for explaining the distinguishing
characteristics of e-legislating in Part III below. But first, Part II
describes e-legislating and puts it within the context of the traditional
process of making federal laws in the United States.
II
CITIZEN INPUT INTO FEDERAL LEGISLATION

In contrast to other subsets of e-democracy described in Part I, this
Article focuses on the newest member of the e-democracy family: elegislating. E-legislating represents a step beyond these other forms of
e-democracy in that it involves an effort to use electronic mediums to
influence actual statutory lawmaking. To provide context for this new
form of e-democracy, this section will examine the historic role of
U.S. citizens in creating legislation, describing first the federal
legislative process itself, next the right to petition, and then the citizen
initiative. Finally, Part II.D concludes with a discussion of the
transition of the Obama campaign into Organizing for Action to
illustrate e-legislating as a strategy for permitting citizens to have
meaningful input in the critical stage of law creation.

62 Matt Kibbe, Obama's Mandate is Doomed, FREEDOMWORKS (Mar. 29, 2012),

http://www.freedomworks.org/blog/mkibbe/obamas-mandate-is-doomed.
63 Kibbe, supra note 62.

6 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
65 E.g., Petition U.S. Supreme Courtfor Gay Rights, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook

.com/PetitionUsSupremeCourtForGayRights (last visited July 6, 2013); Zaid Jilani, 20,000
United Republic Members Petition Supreme Court to Overturn Citizens United, REPUBLIC

REPORT (June 8, 2012), http://www.republicreport.org/2012/20000-united-republic
-members-petition-supreme-court-overturn-citizens-united/.
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A. ConstitutionalLimitations
As the creators of one of the first modem democracies, our
Founders struggled to find the proper balance for citizen
participation. 66 They were skeptical of giving citizens direct power to
make laws or even vote in many cases because of the failures of
67
democracy in ancient Greece. James Madison noted in Federalist
No. 10 that a "pure democracy" or "a society consisting of a small
number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in
person" was defective because it offered no cure for "the mischiefs of
,,68
faction.
The result, concluded Madison, was chaos: "[S]uch
democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention;
have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the
rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives, as
they have been violent in their deaths." 6 9
As a result of these concerns, the Founders consciously created a
"republican form of government,, 70 which limited the popular vote
66 As one scholar has noted, "Government by the people represents the maximum, as

government for the people represents the minimum of the democratic process." THOMAS
GOEBEL, A GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE: DIRECT DEMOCRACY INAMERICA, 18901940, at 1 (2007) (citing T.V. Smith, The Voice of the People, 169 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 101, 109 (1933)) (emphasis added).
67 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, at 25 (James Madison) (Doubleday & Co. 2d ed.,
1966) ("Being subjects either of an absolute or limited monarchy, [some celebrated
authors] have endeavored to heighten the advantages, or palliate the evils of those forms,
by placing in comparison the vices and defects of the republican, and by citing as
specimens of the latter the turbulent democracies of ancient Greece and modern Italy.
Under the confusion of names, it has been an easy task to transfer to a republic
observations applicable to a democracy only; and among others, the observation that it can
never be established but among a small number of people, living within a small compass
of territory."); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 16 (James Madison) (Doubleday &
Co. 2d ed., 1966) ("The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public
councils, have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have
everywhere perished . . . ."); id. at 20 ("From this view of the subject it may be concluded
that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens,
who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the
mischiefs of faction."); THE FEDERALIST NO. 21, at 47 (Alexander Hamilton) (Doubleday
& Co. 2d ed., 1966) ("Where the whole power of the government is in the hands of the
people, there is the less pretense for the use of violent remedies in partial or occasional
distempers of the State.").
68 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 51 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005).
69 Id.

70 Article IV, section 4 of the Constitution requires that, "The United States shall

guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect
each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive
(when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence." U.S. CONST. art.
IV, § 4.
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only to election of members of the House of Representatives.n For
over a century, U.S. citizens had no direct voice in electing their
senators. 72 The President was, and still is, chosen through an Electoral
College, selected by state representatives rather than the people
directly.
The process of enacting legislation created further distance
between the people and their laws. First, the electorate was limited to
an elite cadre of property owners.74 Second, as noted above, this
71U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. I ("The House of Representatives shall be composed of
Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in
each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch
of the State Legislature.").
72 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend XVII ("The Senate of
the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the
Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote."). Note how this
changed in 1913 with the Seventeenth Amendment, which provided for the popular
election of Senators:
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each
State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have
one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for
electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
73 U.S. CONST. art. II, § I, cl. 2. This portion of the Constitution provides:
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a
Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives
to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or
Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United
States, shall be appointed an Elector.
Id. For the first nine elections, between the years 1789 and 1820, there was no popular
vote at all for the President. HistoricalElection Results: Electoral College Box Scores
1789-1996, NAT'L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., http://www.archives.gov/federal
-register/electoral-college/scores.html (last visited July 6, 2013). With the exception of
four elections, the candidate with the most popular votes or the most Electoral College
votes has won the Presidency. The Electoral College, SOCIAL STUDIES FOR KIDS,
http://www.socialstudiesforkids.com/articles/government/theelectoralcollege.htm
(last
visited July 6, 2013). In the 1800 election, Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr received
equal numbers of Electoral College votes, and Jefferson won the election by a vote in the
House of Representatives. Id. In the election of 1824, Andrew Jackson received the most
electoral votes of any candidate. Id. He did not receive the required number of electoral
votes to win, however. Id. A House of Representatives vote decided the election in favor
of John Quincy Adams. Id. In the 1876 election, Samuel Tilden initially won a greater
number of electoral votes, but a Congressional commission awarded Rutherford B. Hayes
twenty disputed electoral votes, giving Hayes the 185 votes necessary at the time to win
the election. Id. Most recently, in 2000, George W. Bush won the presidential election by
carrying the Electoral College, even though his opponent Al Gore won the popular vote by
more than 500,000 ballots. David Stout, The Final Tally: Gore's Lead in the PopularVote
Now Exceeds 500,000, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2000, at All.
74 The franchise to vote has also been expanded. Initially, the vote was "reserved to
white English-speaking literate males, a majority of whom belonged to the respectable
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limited electorate only voted for members of the House of
Representatives. Under the Constitution, the House had no power to
implement laws unilaterally. All enactments required approval of the
Senate and the signature of the President, neither elected directly by
the people. In sum, while a few were allowed to vote in elections, no
citizen had a direct vote in the legislative process. This structure was
intentional to encourage a "deliberative democracy" :
[The Senate] may be sometimes necessary as a defense to the
people against their own temporary errors and delusions. As the
cool and deliberate sense of the community ought, in all
governments, and actually will, in all free governments, ultimately
prevail over the views of its rulers; so there are particular moments
in public affairs when the people, stimulated by some irregular
passion, or some illicit advantage, or misled by the artful
misrepresentations of interested men, may call for measures which
they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and
condemn. In these critical moments, how salutary will be the
interference of some temperate and respectable body of citizens, in
order to check the misguided career, and to suspend the blow
justice, and
mediated by the people against themselves, until reason,
76
truth can regain their authority over the public mind?
While the system of checks and balances was appealing to the
Founders, to others they "were directed at perpetuating unequal social
and political relations by frustrating the efforts of the people to

classes." ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 316 (2000). It now includes most citizens over
eighteen years of age including females, minorities, and representatives of all economic
groups. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (declaring all natural born and naturalized
persons in United States to be citizens, prohibiting states from abridging citizens'
privileges or denying to any citizens equal protection of the laws, and penalizing states'
representation level in Congress if states deny voting rights to any male citizen twenty-one
or older); id. amend. XV, § 1 (prohibiting denial or abridgement of voting rights "on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude"); id. amend. XIX (prohibiting
denial or abridgement of voting rights "on account of sex"); id. amend. XXVI, § 1
(prohibiting denial or abridgement of voting rights of citizens eighteen or older "on
account of age"). Some variation exists from state to state about the eligibility of felons to
vote. See Developments in the Law-The Law ofPrisons, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 194249 (2002) (indicating that, as of date of article, eight states permanently disenfranchised all
felons absent gubernatorial pardon or restoration order, five states permanently
disenfranchised large categories of felons, thirty-five states had regimes varying based on
number and severity of offenses, and two allowed convicts to vote while incarcerated).
75 JOSEPH M. BESSETTE, THE MILD VOICE OF REASON: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY &
AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT (1997); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
76 THE FEDERALIST No. 63 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005), available at

http://constitution.org/fed/federa63.htm.
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liberate themselves from the dominance of particular interests."" A
similar desire to upset the status quo of power that prevents
progressive change also drives many current supporters of elegislating.
B. The Petition Clause
While our Founders established a governing process that remains
less democratic than many of its contemporairy counterparts around
78
the world, early citizens of the United States still enjoyed more
power to directly influence legislative decisions than we do today.
These early citizens could participate in federal lawmaking through a
robust use of the Petition Clause.
The Petition Clause is not in the body of the Constitution itself, but
it appears in the First Amendment in the Bill of Rights. It guarantees
citizens the right "to, petition the government for a redress of
grievances." 7 9 The Petition Clause echoed the English Bill of Rights
of 1689,80 which had its origins in chapter sixty-one of the Magna
Carta."
As the U.S. Supreme Court has explained, "[t]he right to petition
allows citizens to express their ideas, hopes, and concerns to their
government and their elected representatives." 8 2 It includes any nonviolent method of encouraging or disapproving of actions by any of
the three branches of government, including related departments such
as administrative agencies.8 3 Traditionally, the process for exercising
one's rights under the Clause involved writing letters or gathering
multiple signatures on a petition.
In England and colonial America, "petitions were a major source
for legislative initiatives." 8 4 Petitioning "enjoyed its apex in America"
77 GOEBEL, supra note 66, at 54 (2007).

78 K.K. DuVivier, The United States as a Democratic Ideal? InternationalLessons in
Referendum Democracy, 79 TEMP. L. REv. 821, 823 (2006).
79 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
80 "[I]t is the right of the subjects to petition the king, and all commitments and
prosecutions for such petitioning are illegal." 1 W. & M., Sess. 2, c. 2 (1689).
81 "[I]f we, our justiciary, our bailiffs, or any of our officers, shall in any circumstance
fail in the performance of them, towards any person, . . . the said four barons shall repair to
us, or our justiciary, if we are out of the realm, and, laying open the grievance, shall
petition to have it redressed without delay ..... MAGNA CARTA, ch. 61 (1215).
82 Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2495 (2011).
83 Cal. Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-11 (1972).
84 Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Downsizing the Right to Petition, 93 Nw. U. L. REv.
739, 750 (1999). The petitioning process "originated more bills in pre-constitutional
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in the late eighteenth century, and by 1795, "[t]he principal part of
[Congress's] time [was] taken up in reading and referring petitions." 86
Petitions served as a "tool of democratic mass politics" 87 and were
"the most widespread means for popular participation in the political
process."8 8
Interest groups used petitions to instigate "political dramas and
highlight[] legislative deadlocks . . . [that prevented] popularly-

initiated deliberation on grievances." 8 9 Citizen petitions voiced public
opinion on issues such as whether a National Bank should be created,
how the Cherokees should be treated, and whether to criminalize
dueling. 90
America than any other source of legislation." Stephen Higginson, A Short History of the
Right to Petition Government for the Redress of Grievances, 96 YALE L.J. 142, 144

(1986). For example, in the early 1700s, over half of the statutes in Virginia and
Connecticut originated from petitions to the government. Id. at 144 n.9. In Virginia, the
number of petitions more than doubled in the latter half of the eighteenth century. Norman
B. Smith, "Shall Make No Law Abridging . . ": An Analysis of the Neglected, but Nearly
Absolute, Right ofPetition, 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 1153, 1171-72 (1986) (citing RAYMOND C.
BAILEY, POPULAR INFLUENCE UPON PUBLIC POLICY: PETITIONING IN EIGHTEENTH-

CENTURY VIRGINIA 32 (1979)). Similarly, in 1770, Connecticut's General Assembly acted
on over 150 petitions and created only fifteen laws on its own initiative. Higginson, supra,
at 146; see also STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, 99TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
PETITIONS, MEMORIALS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE CONSIDERATION

OF CONGRESS, MARCH 4, 1789 TO DECEMBER 14, 1795, at 1 n.3 (Comm. Print 1986)
[hereinafter PETITIONS, MEMORIALS] (noting major impact of petitions on federal

legislation during 1790s).
85 Lawson & Seidman, supra note 84, at 750-51 ("The practice of petitioning
flourished in the fledgling national legislature. In the late eighteenth century, petitioning
may well have enjoyed its apex in America, embracing both individual and collective
written requests to the executive, legislative, and judicial branches." (footnote omitted)).

86

David C. Frederick, John Quincy Adams, Slavery, and the Disappearance of the

Right of Petition, 9 LAW & HIST. REv. 113, 117 (1991) (quoting Letter from John Fenno,
U.S. Senate printer, to Joseph Ward (Dec. 25, 1795)).
87 Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial Constitution: The History and Significance of the
Right to Petition, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 2153, 2160 (1998).
88 PETITIONS, MEMORIALS, supra note 84, at 6.
89 Mark, supra note 87, at 2161.

90 Higginson, supra note 84, at 156-57 (first two alterations in original). Higginson
elaborates:
Indeed, in Congress' first decades petitions were received and considered,
typically by referral to committees. The petition-response mechanism dealt
procedurally with such controversial issues as contested election results, the
National Bank, the expulsion of Cherokees from Georgia, land distribution, the
abolition of dueling, government in the territories, the Alien and Sedition Acts,
and the slave trade. Generally, favorable legislation or an adverse report halted
further petitioning.
Id. (footnotes omitted); accord Frederick, supra note 86, at 130 (citing GILBERT H.
BARNES,

THE ANTISLAVERY

IMPULSE:

1830-1844, at

114 (1933))

(noting that
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Although Congress was under no obligation to pass legislation on
the basis of petitions, it took the process of reviewing them seriously.
Until 1836, Congress had a standard procedure for reading and
referring petitions to committees for reports.91 The review process
became unsustainable, however, when Congress was flooded with
anti-slavery petitions, and "[w]ith each succeeding resolution
condemning [slavery and seeking abolition], the number of petitions
multiplied to the point that normal House business became difficult,
on occasion impossible." 9 2 To quell the debate, the House changed its
internal procedures by passing a "gag rule" in 1836, which required
that all anti-slavery petitions be tabled. 9 3
Even though the gag rule was repealed, petitions never regained
their status as a serious agenda-setting tool. 94 Under the 1844 repeal
rule, the process for reviewing petitions was changed. Instead of
receiving the attention of the entire House of Representatives,
petitions were now referred to committees where they would "sleep
the sleep of death."9 5 Thus, the procedure eviscerated the right to
petition because "there was little real difference between rejecting
petitions and referring them to a committee that refused to issue a
report." 96
establishment of National Bank, Cherokee expulsion, cessation of Sunday postal service,
and other matters of substantial public interest had yielded floods of petitions).
91 Frederick, supra note 86, at 118; Mark, supra note 87, at 2160 (noting that "the
process reflected the seriousness of petitions").
92 Frederick, supra note 86, at 130.

93 12 REG. DEB. 4052 (1836) (resolving, on May 26, 1836, that the House of
Representatives would indefinitely table all petitions regarding slavery or its abolition).
This solution was never popular; when proposed previously, it had prompted former
President John Quincy Adams, then serving as Representative from Massachusetts, to
comment, "Well, sir, you begin with suppressing the right of petition; you must next
suppress the right of speech in this House." 12 REG. DEB. 2002 (1835).
94 Michael Kent Curtis, The Curious History of Attempts to Suppress Antislavery
Speech, Press,and Petition in 1835-37, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 785, 848-49 (1995). Professor

Curtis relates:
To many Congressmen, as Adams put it, the resolution was "a direct violation of
the constitution of the United States . . . and the rights of my constituents." As
predicted by many, both in and out of Congress, the gag rule became a cause
celebre, and the abolitionists made the most of it. Adams conducted brilliant
guerilla warfare against it until it was finally abandoned in 1844.
Id.

95 11 REG. DEB. 1137 (1835) (speech of Rep. John Dickson of New York (quoting
Psalms 13:3)).

96 Frederick, supra note 86, at 127. As Representative Slade.of Vermont said scornfully
of petitions regarding slavery being delayed indefinitely by referral to a committee that
would not issue a report, "The sacred right of petition!-that is to say, the 'sacred right' of
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C. Citizen Initiatives
Most modem democracies allow. for some form of direct citizen
input into government.97 While U.S. citizens have never been given a
vote on their federal Constitution, the states, which had embraced
referendums from colonial times, 99 referred each of their state
constitutions to their citizens for ratification. 0 0 Despite allowing
citizen input on ratification, however, the states, in these
constitutions, followed the federal government's lead in creating a
system of representative democracy that strictly limited their citizens'
direct roles in making legislation. 1 being 'nailed to the table,' ... or the 'sacred right' of being gathered . .. into the 'family
vault of all the Capulets."' 12 REG. DEB. 2043 (1835).

97 DuVivier, supra note 78, at 823 (noting that the United States is one of only five
significant democracies in the world that has never held a nationwide electorate vote on
some public issue).
98 The Federal Constitution was ratified by conventions instead of a general vote. The
Ratification ofthe Constitution, NATIONAL ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/education
/lessons/constitution-day/ratification.htm (last visited July 7, 2013).
99 Referendums date as far back as the Mayflower Treaty in 1620. Bruno Kaufmann &
M. Dane Waters, Introduction, in DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE: A COMPREHENSIVE
REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM PROCESS INEUROPE, at xix, xix
(Bruno Kaufmann & M. Dane Waters eds., 2004) [hereinafter DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN
EUROPE]. Even though the word "referendum" derives from the word "refer" and has been

used only for measures that a political entity refers to the people, recent commentators
have embraced the term to mean any "mass electorate vote[] on some public issue." David
Butler & Austin Ranney, Practice, in REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD: THE
GROWING USE OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY 1, 1 & n. 1 (David Butler & Austin Ranney eds.,
1994) [hereinafter REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD]. Although the word "plebiscite"
seems to more accurately describe any vote of the people, the word has taken on a negative
connotation because plebiscites in Germany and other parts of the world were used as ad
hoc votes to reinforce the actions of dictators. Id. For example, in March of 1936, Hitler's
Reichstag was approved by 98.1% of Germans. MAIJA SETALA, REFERENDUMS AND
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT: NORMATIVE THEORY AND THE ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONS
1-2 (1999).
lot All eligible citizens in Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts directly
decided on their state constitutions by participating in referendums. FREDERIC JESUP
STIMSON, POPULAR LAW-MAKING: A STUDY OF THE ORIGIN, HISTORY, AND PRESENT
TENDENCIES OF LAW-MAKING BY STATUTE 297 (1910) (noting: "for no constitution, with
the exception of that of Virginia, has ever been adopted in any of our States except by the
people at an election"). All states after 1910 have also adopted their state constitutions by
a popular vote, and even Virginia submitted its constitution to a vote of the people in 1970.
Constitutions of the Several States, GREEN PAPERS, http://www.thegreenpapers.com/slg
/constitution.phtml (last visited July 7, 2013).
101 A handful of states granted their citizens the right to instruct their legislators. 1
ANNALS OF CONG. 685-792 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834), reprintedin 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1095 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1971) [hereinafter BILL OF
RIGHTS HISTORY] (statement of Rep. Burke of South Carolina). "[T]he constitutions of
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina, all of them recognise [sic], in express
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In the late 1890s, citizens began demanding the right to have a
more direct voice. The Progressive party platform at this time
included the ability of citizens to initiate legislation by gathering
signatures.102 The citizen initiativelo0 was part of a package of
reforms introducing more democratic processes as a cure for
corruption and inaction by representative governments. 10 4 Woodrow
Wilson called the citizen initiative the "gun behind the door, 105 of the
legislatures because it allowed citizens to force legislation when
elected officials were "paralyzed by inaction" from incompetence, or
more often, from being controlled by moneyed special interests. The
citizen initiative was an alternative way of making law that allowed
"ordinary citizens to bypass [legislators] beholden to special interests
[and] forcefully reminded lawmakers of the will of the majority
outside the regular election cycle."106 Citizens signed the petition; the
measure was placed on the ballot; and if voted up by a majority of
citizens, it became law. Thus, the citizen initiative allowed the people

terms, the right of the people to give instruction to their representatives." Id. at 1103.
Maryland may also have allowed this right. Id.
102 THOMAS

E.

CRONIN,

DIRECT DEMOCRACY:

THE POLITICS OF

INITIATIVE,

REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 50-51 (1989).

103 For the purposes of this Article, the term "initiative" will generically encompass any
direct democracy mechanism that forces a legislature to consider a matter outside the
standard representative process. Direct democracy comes in many forms and varies widely
from state to state. Some distinguish an "initiative" as a measure that citizens originate by
petition from a "referendum," which is legislation originating from a legislature and
referred to the people for a vote. Other terms used to describe the process include
"plebiscite," "proposition," or "amendment." See generally INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM
INST., A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM PROCESS IN THE UNITED

STATES, [hereinafter IRI BRIEF HISTORY], available at www.iandrinstitute.org/New

%201RI%2OWebsite%2OInfo/Drop%2ODown%2OBoxes/Quick%20Facts/History%20of
%201&R.pdf; K.K. DuVivier, By Going Wrong All Things Come Right: Using Alternative
Initiatives to Improve Citizen Lawmaking, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1185, 1185 n.2 (1995).
104 See GOEBEL, supra note 66, at 3-4. In addition to the initiative and referendum

process, the Progressive movement sought a number of political reforms, including secret
ballots, direct election of United States senators, primary elections, and women's suffrage.
Id. at 4.
105 Id. at 55.
106 IRI BRIEF HISTORY, supra note 103, at 2; see also Elizabeth Garrett, Direct
Democracy, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 139 (Daniel

A. Farber & Anne Joseph O'Connell eds., 2010); Daniel A. Smith & Dustin Fridkin,
Delegating DirectDemocracy: InterpartyLegislative Competition and the Adoption ofthe

Initiative in the American States, 102 AM. POLL SCI. REV. 333 (2008) (noting that when it
was introduced, the initiative process allowed strong minority parties to dilute the
institutional power of majority parties).
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to enact statutes directly and to circumvent legislatures instead of
working with them.10 7
With South Dakota as the first in 1898, os twenty-four states have
now adopted some form of statewide. process for citizen input in
passing legislative, and sometimes constitutional, provisions.109
Initiative use surged in its early years, declined from the 1940s to
1960s,11 0 and then re-surged starting in the 1970s. 1 ' The momentum
continues today.112
107 See, e.g., Beall v. State, 103 A. 99, 102-03 (Md. 1917) (opining that Maryland and
other states amended their constitutions to provide for referendum veto of legislation in
order to eliminate alleged control and corruption by "great corporations" and political
parties); State v. Howell, 181 P. 920, 922 (Wash. 1919) (opining that citizens asserted
referendum power due to perception that legislature had become unresponsive to popular
will). One New Jersey reformer concluded that "representative government is a failure."
GOEBEL, supra note 66, at 36. On another occasion, supporters of direct legislation by the
electorate characterized representative government as an "utter failure. It fails in the
leaders it develops; it fails in its mechanism. It is cumbrous, uncertain, confused,
irresponsible, undemocratic, often farcical and dishonest, and commonly partisan." Id. at
207 n.35 (quoting DIRECT LEGISLATION RECORD I 84 (Nat'1 Direct Legislation League,
1984)).
10 South Dakota is given credit for having the first initiative process in 1898, and
Oregon is credited with having the first such initiative on a ballot in 1904. CRONIN, supra
note 102; DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES (1984); Garrett, supra note 106, at 137. The historical average of
approval rates for initiatives, from 1904 to 2012, is forty-one percent. INITIATIVE &
REFERENDUM INST., ELECTION RESULTS 2012: BREAKTHROUGH WINS FOR MARIJUANA
AND SAME SEX MARRIAGE 1 (2012) [hereinafter IRI ELECTION RESULTS 2012], available
at http://www.iandrinstitute.org/BW%202012-3%20Election%20results%20v1.pdf.
109 The following states allow some form of initiative: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. See THOMAS M. DURBIN,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., Rep. No. 81-63A, INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM AND RECALL: A
RESUME OF STATE PROVISIONS (1981); IRI BRIEF HISTORY, supra note 103, at 4-5; see
also Nathaniel A. Persily, The Peculiar Geography of Direct Democracy: Why the
Initiative,Referendum and Recall Developed in the American West, 2 MICH. L. & POL'Y
REV. 11, 15 (1997) ("[T]wenty-five states [] have the referendum, twenty-three having
some form of the initiative . . . ."). For a time, referendums represented a phenomenon
largely limited to the West. When Alaska joined the Union in 1959, its constitution
included the right for citizens to enact statutes or amend the state constitution by initiative.
Florida adopted the statewide initiative in 1968, and Illinois followed suit in 1970. In
1996, Rhode Island became the most recent state to adopt the process. IRI BRIEF HISTORY,
supra note 103, at 5.
110 See Charles M. Price, Initiative Qualifying in the States, 1898-1989: Variations in
Usage, 12 FAM. L. & DEMOCRACY REP. 4, 4 (Feb. 1990). Thomas Goebel notes there
were 246 ballot propositions in the 1930s, only 146 in the 1940s, and a mere eighty-five in
the 1960s. GOEBEL, supra note 66, at 186. However, the number has grown steadily since
the 1970s. Id. at 186-87; see also IRI BRIEF HISTORY, supra note 103, at 8 (reporting that
initiative use peaked at 293 from 1911 to 1920, but steadily declined in subsequent
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In 2012, American citizens in thirty-nine states voted on 186
statewide initiatives and referendums.
Forty-eight of these were
citizen-initiated measures.1 14 Historically, Oregon, California,
Colorado, North Dakota, and Arizona have used the referendum
process most extensively.' 1 5 California and Oregon alone accounted
for nearly one-third of all qualifying citizen initiatives in the 1980s,
and the five high-use states historically accounted for nearly sixty
percent of all citizen initiatives. 1 1 6 Some commentators note that in
states with the highest initiative use, all significant amendments to
these states' constitutions have originated as citizen-initiated
measures. 117
Not long after initiative use resurged in the 1970s, commentators
began to reassess the process.' 1 8 Criticisms sparked proposals for
decades to a low of eighty-seven from 1961 to 1970, largely because of the two World
Wars, the Great Depression, and the Korean War).
111 Two of the most expansive decades of.initiative use occurred during the years of
1981-1990 and 1991-2000, where there were 271 and 389 initiative platforms
respectively. IRI BRIEF HISTORY, supra note 103, at 8.
112 The 1990-1999 decade and the 2000-2009 decade both resulted in records of over
350 initiatives each. IRI BRIEF HISTORY, supra note 103, at 7-8.
113 IRI ELECTION RESULTS 2012, supra note 108, at 1. In contrast, there were 163 in the
2004 November elections. BALLOT INITIATIVE STRATEGY CTR., BALLOT INITIATIVE &
REFERENDUM, 2004 ELECTION RESULTS 2, 4 (2004), available at http://bisc.3cdn.net
/386f89bb7ca82d0632-drm6iydOf.pdf. Further, the November 2000 election involved only
seventy-six. INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST., GENERAL ELECTION POST ELECTION
REPORT 7 (2002) [hereinafter IRI POST ELECTION REPORT], available at http://www.iandr
institute.org/New%20IRI%20Website%20Info/Drop%20Down%20Baoxes/Election%20
Reports/2002%20General%20Election/2002%20POST-election%20Report%20-%2012
-11-02%20-%20State%20by%20State.pdf.
114 IRI ELECTION RESULTS 2012, supra note 108, at 1.
115 Oregon has proposed 325 measures; California, 279; Colorado, 183; North Dakota,
168; and Arizona, 154. IRI BRIEF HISTORY, supra note 103, at 8.
116 See Price, supra note 110, at 4 (comparing the use of citizen-initiated referendums
in the then twenty-three states that allowed this form of referendum).
117 Richard B. Collins, How DemocraticAre Initiatives?,72 U. COLO. L. REV. 983, 983
nn.2-3 (2001). Collins based his observations, in part, on data collected by Dennis Polhill.
See Dennis Polhill, Are Coloradans Fit to Make Their Own Laws? A Common-Sense
Primeron the Initiative Process, Issue Paper no. 8-96, INDEP. INST. app. B (Oct. 24, 1996)
(summarizing election results on all Colorado ballot issues from 1912 to 1995),
http://liberty.i2i.org/files/2011/02/IP_8-96.pdf; see also PHILIP L. DUBOIS & FLOYD
FEENEY, LAWMAKING BY INITIATIVE: ISSUES, OPTIONS AND COMPARISONS 30 (1998);
CAL. COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE: SHAPING CALIFORNIA'S
FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT (1992); Hans A. Linde, Taking Oregon's Initiative
Towarda New Century, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 391, 391-98 (1998).
Its MAGLEBY, supra note 108, at 5; see, e.g., Sherman J. Clark, A Populist Critique of
Direct Democracy, 112 HARv. L. REV. 434 (1998) (arguing that plebiscites do not
accurately reflect the complexities of voter preferences); Julian N. Eule, JudicialReview of
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reform." 9 Some of the sharpest criticism has arisen from the
application of direct democracy in the context of complex fiscal
decisions. 120 "[V]oters do not fully understand the relationship
between current deficits and future taxes," expecting to be "taxed like
libertarians, but subsidized like socialists." 121 One argument is that
tax and other complex issues should remain within the exclusive
province of representatives so that lawmakers can - better weigh
complex and competing concerns and respond to changing
conditions.122 Many blame California's fiscal dysfunction on direct
democracy.123 Estimates of the percentage of California's budget tied
Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503 (1990) (discussing how courts should proceed in
deciding constitutionality challenges to voter enactments); David B. Magleby, Let the
Voters Decide? An Assessment of the Initiative and Referendum Process, 66 U. COLO. L.
REV. 13, 46 (1995) ("Direct legislation is at best a supplement to representative
democracy.").
119 See, e.g., CAL. COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE: SHAPING
CALIFORNIA'S FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT (1992); Collins, supra note 117;

Richard B. Collins & Dale Oesterle, Structuring the Ballot Initiative: Procedures That Do
andDon't Work, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 47 (1995); PETER SCHRAG, PARADISE LOST (1998).
120 Peter Conti-Brown, DirectDemocracy and State FiscalCrises: The Problem of Too
Much Law, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 43 (2012); Jessica A. Levinson & Robert
M. Stern, Ballot Box Budgeting in California: The Bane of the Golden State or an
OverstatedProblem?, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 689, 696 & n.34 (2010). But see John G.
Matsusaka, Direct Democracy and Fiscal Gridlock: Have Voter Initiatives Paralyzed the
CalforniaBudget?, 5 ST. POL. & POL'Y Q. 248 (2005) [hereinafter FiscalGridlock]; John
G. Matsusaka, Direct Democracy Works, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 185 (2005). But see David
M. Primo, The Effect of Initiatives on Local Government Spending, 22 J. THEORETICAL
POL. 6 (2010) (arguing that spending mandates reduced deadweight costs of taxation and
increased local spending twelve to fourteen percent); S. Brock Blomberg, Gregory D. Hess
& Akila Weerapana, The Impact of Voter Initiatives on Economic Activity, 20 EUR. J.POL.
ECON. 207 (2004) (arguing that states with initiative systems waste twenty to thirty
,percent fewer resources).
121 Conti-Brown, supra note 120, at 44 nn.3-4. In addition to California, discussed
below, Colorado citizens have passed initiatives over the years that first cut taxes and then
required certain payments to schools, creating conflicting, irreconcilable mandates.
122 Levinson & Stern, supra note 120, at 696 & n.34. But see Conti-Brown, supra note
120, at 45 (advocating that fiscal policy-making be taken from both the legislature and
initiative/referendum control and instead lodged in a "federally created commission called
the Fiscal Restoration Commission").
123 Fiscal Gridlock, supra note 120, at 250 tbl.1 (providing pundit comments on
initiatives and the California budget from Panetta, Broder, Tyson, Schrag & ECONOMIST).
Note that California voters passed Prop. 30 on November 6, 2012. CaliforniaProposition
30, Sales and Income Tax Increases (2012), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/wiki
/index.php/California.Proposition_30,_SalesandIncomeTax_Increase_%282012%29
(last modified Feb. 18, 2013). This proposition increases taxes on earnings over $250,000
for seven years and sales taxes by one-fourth of a percent for four years, to fund schools.
Id. Prop. 30 also guarantees public safety realignment funding. Id. The fiscal impact will
be increased state tax revenues through 2018-19, averaging about $6 billion annually over
the next few years. Id. These revenues will be available for funding the state budget. Id.
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up by voter-mandated initiatives range from thirty-three to seventy
percent.124 These unfunded set-asides, in combination with initiativecreated restrictions on raising revenue, like Proposition 13, have
"increased nonguaranteed debt," "privatized the public fisc," and
"devolved the authority to lay and collect taxes and to spend the
proceeds so gained." 12 5
Despite these problems, the approval rate for initiatives is high,126
and initiative democracy continues to grow. Defenders argue that
initiatives serve as a valuable way of giving citizens a direct voice in
theiP government. Elizabeth Garrett notes that "the appropriate frame
for any analysis of direct democracy is that of 'hybrid democracy"'
because of the profound impact "the presence of robust direct
democracy" has on "[1]egislators and the traditional legislative
process."l27 Even though the initiative process is currently restricted
to state and local governments, it has had considerable influence on
public policy nationwide. 1 28
So, should we have a national initiative process to allow citizen
input on federal legislation? Scholars have proposed such a process to
allow citizens to initiate laws at the federal level, whether through a
bindingl29 or nonbinding vote. 1o In fact, some opinion polls have
Additionally, in 2012-13, planned spending reductions, primarily to education programs,
will not occur. Id. But Prop. 31 failed. CalforniaProposition31, Two-Year State Budget

http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/California
BALLOTPEDIA,
Cycle
(2012),
Proposition_..31,_Two-YearStateBudgetCycle_%282012%29 (last modified Feb. 21,
2013). Prop. 31 would have established a two-year state budget and set rules for offsetting
new expenditures and Governor budget cuts in fiscal emergencies. Id.
124 Levinson & Stem, supra note 120, at 697 & nn.39-40.
125 Colin H. McCubbins & Mathew D. McCubbins, Proposition 13 and the Cahfornia
Fiscal Shell Game, 2 CAL. J. POL. & POL'Y 1 (2010). See also Nicholas Hromalik, Setting
Aside Politicians: The Effects of Set-Aside Initiativeson CaliforniaLocal Governments, 2

CAL. J.POL. & POL'Y 1 (2010) (arguing initiatives create "higher taxes on all").
126 IRI ELECTION RESULTS 2012, supra note 108, at 1.

127 Garrett, supra note 106, at 138..
128 Initiatives on various public policy issues have brought about fundamental changes
in the United States, including, but not limited to: women gaining the right to vote;
election of politicians through direct primaries; prohibition on state-funded abortions;
creation of the eight-hour workday; legalization of physician-assisted suicide; placement
of term limits on elected officials; adoption and abolishment of prohibition; abolishment of
poll taxes; legalization of marijuana; and adoption of campaign finance reform. IRI BRIEF
HISTORY, supra note 103, at 6.
129 See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR & ALAN HIRSCH, FOR THE PEOPLE: WHAT THE

CONSTITUTION REALLY SAYS ABOUT YOUR RIGHTS 38 (1998); CRONIN, supra note 102,
at 12-22, 41; Alan Hirsch, Direct Democracy and Civic Maturation,29 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 185 (2002); Clayton P. Gillette, Is Direct Democracy Anti-Democratic?, 34
WILLAMETrE L. REv. 609, 618 (1998); Dennis W. Arrow, Representative Government
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shown that the majority of Americans would favor a nati6nal statutory
initiative.
Yet, there has been no indication that Congress has the
slightest interest in sharing with citizens any of its power to create
laws. E-legislating may change this.
D. E-Legislating Under the Obama Administration
The petition and initiative efforts outlined above currently fail to
give citizens any direct role in federal lawmaking beyond electing
their representatives. E-legislating represents how electronic tools
might change that dynamic. This section illustrates the growing
significance of e-legislating by describing how Obama supporters
have used, and plan to use, e-legislating to increase citizen
involvement in the lawmaking process.
Obama's community organizer roots132 were reflected from the
very start of his 2008 campaign. His message of inclusiveness and
self-actualization resonated with voters, enabling him to motivate
record numbers to register and vote.'3 It is no surprise that the very
first document Obama signed when he took office in 2009 was the

and Popular Distrust: The Obstruction/Facilitation Conundrum Regarding State
ConstitutionalAmendment by Initiative Petition, 17 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 3 (1992).

130 DuVivier, supra note 78 (calling for a federal nonbinding initiative process to allow
citizen votes on issues ofnational significance).
131A national poll reflected backing for a national statutory initiative at a three-to-one
margin (with fifty-seven percent of Americans favoring it and only twenty-one percent
opposed). DAVID D. SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAWMAKERS: THE BALLOT INITIATIVE
REVOLUTION 176 (1989); see also CRONIN, supra note 102, at 4-5, 157-95 (1989);
MAGLEBY, supra note 108 at 7, 12-14. Mike Gravel, a former U.S. Senator from Alaska,

used the Internet to garner support for the National Initiative for Democracy, a proposed
constitutional amendment and federal statute to establish procedures for citizens to make
laws by ballot initiative. See Senator Mike Gravel, Edwin and Joyce Koupal's
Contribution to Democracy, THE DEMOCRACY FOUNDATION (Sept. 1, 2001),
http://demofound.org /symposium/5.htm; National Citizens Initiativefor Democracy, THE
DEMOCRACY FOUNDATION, http://ni4d.us/national initiative (last visited July 12, 2013).
132See BARACK OBAMA, DREAMS FROM MY FATHER, 164-206,249-95 (2004).

133Approximately 146 million people were registered and 131 million people voted in
the 2008 presidential election, an increase of four million registrations and five million
votes from 2004. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, VOTING AND
REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 2008, at 1 (2012), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/201Opubs/p20-562.pdf The number of voters was the most
ever in a presidential election, though the percentage of voter turnout did not set a record,
possibly because of low Republican turnout. Number of Votes Cast Set Record, But Voter

Turnout Percentage Didn't, CNN, Nov. 6, 2008, http://articles.cnn.com/2008-l1-06
/politics/voter.turnout 1_voter-turnout-curtis-gans-absentee-ballots?_s=PM:POLITICS.
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Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government. 1 34 In this
memorandum, Obama announced his vision that government should
stand on three pillars-transparency,
participation,
and
collaboration-and that this vision was to be implemented through
digital technology.1 35
While some argue that Obama's pledge was more symbolic than
substantive,136 a number of federal agencies responded with
innovative digital outreach projects. NASA used social media tools to
promote interest in its missions. 1 37 The Federal Communication
Commission's website allowed citizens to track its broadband plan
and share information with the agency through Twitter.' 3 8 In addition,
the Recovery.gov website provided fiscal transparency by allowing
anyone to track spending on projects funded by the Stimulus bill and
to report fraud or waste.
134 Transparency and Open Government: Memorandum for the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009) [hereinafter Transparency
Memorandum].
135 Id. at 4685; see also Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Director, Office of Mgmt.
& Budget, on Open Gov't Directive to the Heads of Exec. Dep't & Agencies 9 (Dec. 8,
2009). The OMB directive lists, as one component of the Open Government plan:
Participation: To create more informed and effective policies, the Federal
Government should promote opportunities for the public to participate
throughout the decision-making process. Your agency's Open Government Plan
should explain in detail how your agency will improve participation, including
steps your agency will take to revise its current practices to increase
opportunities for public participation in and feedback on the agency's core
mission activities. The specific details should include proposed changes to
internal management and administrative policies to improve participation.
i. The Plan should include descriptions of and links to appropriate websites
where the public can engage in existing participatory processes of your
agency.
ii. The Plan should include proposals for new feedback mechanisms,
including innovative tools and practices that create new and easier methods
for public engagement.
Id.
136 Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Transparency, Accountability, and Competency: An
Essay on the ObamaAdministration, Google Government, and the Difficulties ofSecuring
Effective Governance, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 449, 459-75 (2011) ("The Obama
Administration's Commitment to Transparency and Openness is Far From Total.");
Testing Obama's Promise of Government Transparency, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 27, 2012,
9:00 PM), http://go.bloomberg.com/multimedialbloomberg-checks-obama-transparency/
(providing an open government scorecard).
137 Connect and Collaborate with NASA, NASA.Gov, http://www.nasa.gov/connect
/social/index.html (last visited July 12, 2013).
138 FCC Connect, FCC.Gov, http://www.fcc.gov/connect (last visited Feb. 28, 2013).
139 Track the Money, RECOVERY.Gov, http://www.recovery.gov/Pages/default.aspx

(last visited July 12, 2013).
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Among the three pillars of government laid out, Obama's approach
was perhaps most innovative in its commitment to "offer Americans
increased opportunities to participate in policymaking and to provide
their Government with the benefits of their collective expertise and
information." 4 0 Thus, Obama sought to crowdsource the
development of U.S. policy.
Although the concept of outsourcing problem solving to the public
is not a new idea-at least one author observes that in the late
nineteenth century, the Oxford English Dictionary was "history's first
massively-crowdsourced collation of English knowledge"1 4 1
Obama's effort to use online platforms for developing policy was.
The January 2009 Memorandum only addressed action at the
federal administrative level, but even before the election, candidate
Obama had opened up new channels for citizen input on legislation
and policy. Candidate Obama offered citizens the opportunity to
submit ideas and questions to him through the Change.gov platform,
and he received almost five million votes on some of the ideas

submitted.142
In addition, the Obama administration created something
comparable to the constitutional right to petition. As discussed in Part
II.B above, petitions are now routinely ignored by Congress. In
140

Transparency Memorandum, supra note 134, at 4685. That portion of the memo

states:
Government should be participatory. Public engagement enhances the
Government's effectiveness and improves the quality of its decisions.
Knowledge is widely dispersed in society, and public officials benefit from
having access to that dispersed knowledge. Executive departments and agencies
should offer Americans increased opportunities to participate in policymaking
and to provide their Government with the benefits of their collective expertise
and information. Executive departments and agencies should also solicit public
input on how we can increase and improve opportunities for public participation
in Government.
Id.
141Nate Lanxon, How the Oxford English Dictionary Started out like Wikipedia,
WIRED.CO.UK (Jan. 13, 2011) http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2011-01/13/the
-oxford-english-wiktionary.
142 However, when Obama tried similar participatory activities as President, such as the
Open Government Initiative, the number of participants dropped with each phase, down to
approximately 2000 in the last. SCOTT BITTLE, CHRIS HALLER & ALISON KADLEC, CENT.
FOR ADVANCES IN PuB. ENGAGEMENT, PROMISING PRACTICES IN ONLINE ENGAGEMENT

5, n.6 (2009), available at http://www.publicagenda.org/files/pdf/PACAPEPaper3
PromisingMech2.pdf; Jesse Lee, Open for Questions Round 2: Response, CHANGE.GOV
(Jan. 9, 2009), http://change.gov/newsroom/entry/open for.questions round2.response/
(cited in Paul Johnston, Transforming Government's Policy-Making Processes, 2
EJOURNAL EDEMOCRACY & OPEN Gov'T 162, 162 n.2 (2010)).

38

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92, 9

response, the Obama administration attempted to create an electronic
counterpart within the Executive branch. On September 22, 2011, the
White House launched its "We the People" website. 14 3 Through the
website, the administration pledges to respond to any petition that
meets its threshold of signatures.144 Unlike Congress, which could
reinvigorate the petition process to set its legislative agenda, the
White House may not have the power to use this platform to create
laws. However, the electronic petition platform at least provides an
outlet, for citizen frustration and some kind of government response to
petitions, which was foreclosed when Congress adopted its current
procedure.
The "We the People" platform has opened discussion on important
issues, but some citizens also have abused it. For example, a Colorado
man filed a petition on November 14, 2012, for the "construction of a
Death Star by 2016.',145 That petition met the threshold for signatures,
thus requiring a government response.146
In addition to his "We the People" website and his Memorandum
on Transparency and Open Government, President Obama declared,
when he first welcomed his senior staff and cabinet to the White
House in 2009, that "the way to solve the problems of our time, as
one nation, is by involving the American people in shaping the
policies that affect their lives." 1 4 7 His use of the phrase, "You and I,
as citizens" in his 2013 inauguration address echoes the same

143 Katelyn Sabochik, Petition the White House with We the People, WHITE

HOUSE.GOV (Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/09/22/petition-white
-house-we-people.
144 We the People, Terms of Participation, WHITE HOUSE.GOV, https://petitions

.whitehouse.gov/how-why/terms-participation (last visited July 12, 2013) (indicating that
the signature threshold was raised to 100,000 on January 15, 2013).
145Secure Resources and Funding, and Begin Construction of a Death Star by 2016,

Petition to the Obama Administration, WHITE HOUSE.GOV, https://petitions.whitehouse
.gov/petition/secure-resources-and-funding-and-begin-construction-death-star-2016/wlfKz
FkN (last visited July 12, 2013).
146 At the time the Death Star petition was filed, the threshold for signatures was only
25,000. The petition received 27,456. Mitchell Byars, Longmont Man's Petitionfor U.S.Built Death Star Draws Support, DENVER POST (Dec. 15, 2012), http://www.denverpost
.com/news/ci_22196415/longmont-mans-petition-u-s-built-death-star?.
147Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the President in
Welcoming Senior Staff and Cabinet Secretaries to the. White House (Jan. 21, 2009),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-welcomingsenior-staff-and-cabinet-secretaries-white-house.
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theme. 14 8 And the Organizing for Action campaign seems to be
taking this goal to the new level of e-legislating.
With the current representative government, U.S. citizens have a
significant voice during elections but virtually no voice between
election cycles when actual laws are made. During the legislating
phase, large donors and interest groups with enough money to hire
lobbyists enjoy a significant advantage in terms of gaining legislators'
attention. The average citizen is relegated to expressing his or her
opinion at town hall meetings or through an occasional phone call or
letter that is easily lost among the thousands received each week.149
What will Organizing for Action do to shift the balance so that
average citizens will have more say in legislating? The website is
vague: "this is your movement . .. it can do whatever you make of

Presumably, the approach will involve campaigns with
"ladders-of-engagement,"1
combining many of the actions in
electronic as well as traditional forms: petitions, letter writing, calls to
representatives, rallies, and lobbying opportunities. What will be
different is the potential for intensifying all of these activities through
the power of the Internet and social media so that they become more
effective. Thus, e-legislating will allow a difference-in-degree of
citizen activity.
Will e-legislating also allow citizen participation of a
fundamentally different kind? Perhaps so. The extension of the
fundraising function will allow groups to prepare and air
informational ads to hold legislators accountable. In addition, the
following section will describe in more detail some of the distinctions
between e-legislating and traditional citizen input into federal
legislation. The goal is to use the "powerful transformative potential"
of digital technologies to "begin a new chapter in citizen participation
and public accountability." 5 2
it."iso

148Barack Obama, President of the United States, 2013 Inaugural Address (Jan. 21,
2013), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/21
/transcript-president-obama-2013-inaugural-address/.
149 E-mail from Mark Udall, U.S. Senator for Colorado, to author (Jan. 28, 2013) (on
file with author) (estimating he receives 10,000 letters each week).
150 Michele

Obama,

Organizing for Action:

You

In?, BARACKOBAMA.COM,

https://my.barackobama.com/page/s/organizing-for-action (last visited July 12, 2013).
151David Karpf, Online PoliticalMobilizationfrom the Advocacy Group'sPerspective:
Looking Beyond Clicktivism, 2 POL'y & INTERNET 7, 16 (2010).
152 Jennifer Shkabatur, Digital Technology and Local Democracy in America, 76
BROOK. L. REv. 1413, 1416 (2011).
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III
DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS OF E-LEGISLATING

The Internet was a critical component of Revolution 2.0's success.
Without the ability to enter the world stage cheaply, the Facebook and
Twitter coordinators of the revolution would not have -been able to
gain global support and protection because of the world's scrutiny of
the situation. Without the safe space of the Internet, the coordinators
could have been more easily isolated and silenced by authorities.'
Without the speed and flexibility provided by the Internet to adjust to
on-the-ground conditions, the groups of protestors could have been
crushed by government forces.1 54 Without instantaneous posts that
included compelling, emotional music and graphics, Khaled's death
and the following demonstrations would not have had the personal
relevance needed to create community involvement and motivate
mass participation.*155
While some authors argue that online activism simply represents a
"difference-of-degree rather than a difference-in-kind" from
traditional activism,156 this section will address the "unique
characteristics" of the Internet' 5 7 and some of the arguments that have
been made about whether these characteristics justify different
153 As Ghonim noted at the end of his book,
The Egyptian revolution showed us that the great mass of people who are
normally risk-averse, aren't normally activists, can become extraordinarily
brave and active when they unite together as one. It was like an offline
Wikipedia, with everyone anonymously and selflessly contributing efforts
toward a common goal.... Revolutions of the past have usually had charismatic
leaders who were politically savvy and sometimes even military geniuses. Such
revolutions followed what we can call the Revolution 1.0 model. . . . [Egypt]
was the Revolution 2.0 model: no one was the hero because everyone was a
hero.
GHONIM, supra note 2, at 293-94.
154 The protests swelled as news got out on the Internet. Rumors were that the
government tried to block access, but some electronic messages could still get through.
E.g., GHONIM, supra note 2, at 184-86. Although the Syrian government claims it was not
responsible, Internet access disappeared across the country for multiple days at the end of
November 2012-raising fears of escalation of a government crackdown on the uprising.
Catherine Smith, Syria's Internet Reportedly Shut Down, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 29,
2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/29/syria-internet-down-n_2211458 html.
155 It was a photograph of Khaled's battered face that first motivated Ghonim to launch
the webpage. GHONIM, supra note 2, at 59. Ghonim posted a stirring video with music
instead of using "the regular practice of lawyers and human rights defenders, who used
facts and statistics to garner support. Instead, the video created an emotional bond between
the cause and the target audience." GHONIM, note 2, at 86-87.
156 Karpf, supra note 151, at 9.
157. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 583 (2002).
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treatment of Internet data under the law. It also will consider whether
the use of the Internet may result in a different quality of response
from citizens and legislators that could undermine its effectiveness.
This section concludes with the ultimate question: whether elegislating efforts will have any greater impact than conventional
lobbying campaigns.
A. Size and GeographicScope of the Internet
"A unique and wholly new medium of worldwide human
communication. "' 58

Thomas Paine's best-selling pamphlet Common Sense helped drive
the American Revolutionary War. Advocating an alternative to
British rule, its influence spread as 120,000 to 150,000 copies were
printed in 1776 and circulated across colonial America, where it was
read aloud in homes and taverns.' 59 But the ability of the printing
press to disperse information is no match for the eye-popping
numbers of the Internet for which the term "going viral" was coined
to capture the enormity of the phenomenon.160 With one post, the
Egyptian revolutionaries expanded their reach twenty times, leading
them to conclude that Mubarak's "usual methods of oppression might
not work in this new world."' 6 1
While quantity of participants may be the most obvious distinction
between traditional input to legislators and e-legislating, the
additional number of participants may be detrimental if their input is
duplicative and unfiltered. In the context of e-rulemaking, some
agency recipients have objected to the extra administrative and mental
burden of sorting through vast numbers of comments to find those
with relevance and focus.
As with the number of legal arguments

158 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997) (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F.Supp.
824, 844 (1996)). The Court in Reno held the Communications Decency Act of 1996 was
facially overbroad and unconstitutional. Reno, 521 U.S.'at 864-65.
159 Robert A. Ferguson, The Commonalities of Common Sense, 57 WM. & MARY

Q.

465, 466 (2000).
160 Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines "viral" as "quickly and widely spread or
popularized especially by person-to-person electronic communication." Viral, MERRIAMWEBSTER.CoM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/viral (last visited July 12,
2013).
161 The Revolutionaries went from about 5000 to 7000 followers to 120,000 followers
with one post. GHONIM, supra note 2, at 84-85.
162 Benjamin, supra note 45, at 909.
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in a brief, the inclusion of weaker points may dilute the impact of
stronger ones.
Closely .related to the numbers of participants is the world-wide
scope of Internet postings. As the Supreme Court has noted, "the
geographic reach of the Internet is greater than anything which could
have been designed in colonial times."1 63 This combination of
breadth, along with the inability to control the geographic location of
its audience, split the Court in its consideration of the impact of the
Internet when determining whether the Child Online Protection Act
violated First Amendment guarantees of free speech.164 This
geographic breadth may be an advantage for getting information out
to all parts of the country. However, in the legislative context,
effective pressure on a particular representative will most likely come
from those who have the power to vote him or her out of office. Thus,
identifying whether those commenting are constituents is important.
B. Anonymity of and Cost to Internet Speakers
"[E]asy and cheap to reach a worldwide audience."l65
The standing joke is that we are younger, taller, and better looking
on the Internet than in real life.16 6 This is because the audience
usually does not know the person behind the other screen. Anonymity
was critical in Egypt's Revolution 2.0. When the authors of the
revolutionary "We Are All Khaled" website accidentally released data
via their posts that could have been used to identify them, they
panicked, believing the government would quickly seek them out and
silence them.167 This has been the fate of some who spoke their minds
163 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 99 (2003). The Smith court held that the Alaska Sex
Offender Registry Act was not punitive even though the data was posted on the Internet,
which provided for widespread public access outside of the state. Id. at 105, 109.
164 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 565, 586 (2002) (remanding case to the Third
Circuit to decide which provisions of the Act might be too broad).
165 Id. at 595.

166 A most recent example is the "Catfish" phenomenon, popularized by a documentary
movie and television show that chronicles online dating relationships where one or both
parties have misrepresented their identity. The recent saga with Notre Dame star football
player Manti Te'o raised the issue to national prominence. See, e.g., Ben Zimmer, Catfish:
How Manti Te'o's Imaginary Romance Got Its Name, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 27, 2013,

http://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2013/01/27/catfish-how-manti-imaginary-romance-got
-its-name/inqu9zV8RQ7j 19BRGQkH7H/story.html.
167 Ghonim refused to disclose that he was the administrator of the Kullena Khaled Said
webpage and panicked when he made mistakes that led a few to discern who he was.
GHONIM, supranote 2, at 115.
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in other countries,168 and it illustrates the significance of this unique
aspect of the Internet forum in those high-risk contexts.
Internet anonymity can also be valuable in the United States.
Although the First Amendment protects us from the government, we
may need to fear extremists who issue death threats if what we have
posted does not mesh with their beliefs. The Supreme Court
addressed the role of anonymity in Doe v. Reed.169 In Reed, plaintiffs
sought a preliminary injunction to bar public disclosure of referendum
petitions.17 0 Plaintiffs were concerned that interest groups planned to
post the petitions on the Internet, exposing the signatories to possible
harassment.1 7 1 The Court held that Washington State's Public
Records Act, which required the disclosure, did not violate the First
Amendment. 172
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion distinguishes the roles citizens
can play in the legislative process as discussed in Part II above. While
the United States currently allows anonymity during the election stage
through a secret ballot,17 3 Scalia observes that "the exercise of
lawmaking power in the United States has traditionally been public...
. [E]ven when the people asked Congress for legislative changes-by
exercising their constitutional right to 'to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances,' U.S. Const., Amdt. 1-they did so
1 74
publicly."
Scalia also noted in his Reed concurrence that when a voter signs a
referendum petition, "he is acting as a legislator."17 5 Therefore,
"electioneering disclosure cases," which allow anonymity, are
168 Keeping anonymity is probably a smart move. For example, thirty-five-year-old
activist blogger Sattar Beheshti fell under the custody of Iran's cyberpolice and was killed
in early November of 2012. The Associated Press, Blogger's Death in Iran Opens Window
on Cyber Patrols,DENVER POST (Nov. 23, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.denverpost.com
/nationworld/ci_22050493?source=rss.
169 John Doe No. I v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010).
170 Id. at 2813.
171 Id. at 2825.
172 Id. at 2821.

173 Scalia notes, however, that this was not always the case: "Legislating was not the
only governmental act that was public in America. Voting was public until 1888 when the
States began to adopt the Australian secret ballot." Id. at 2834.
174 Id. at 2833-34. The opinion goes on to say, "The petition was read aloud in
Congress. Mazzone, Freedom's Associations, 77 WASH. L. REV. 639, 726 (2002)....
Even when the people exercised legislative power directly, they did so not anonymously,
but openly in town hall meetings. See generally J. ZIMMERMAN, THE NEW ENGLAND
TOWN MEETING (1999)." Id. at 2834.
175 Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2833.
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distinguishable from the Reed situation, which involved a referendum,
and therefore, legislative action.176
While there may be advantages to anonymity, it is less valuable in
the context of e-legislating, which encourages others to influence their
legislators on a vote. Contacts with familiar sources usually prove
most persuasive; i.e., in the Obama campaign, social networks made a
difference-Tweets and Facebook messages from friends were more
effective than ads.' 7 7 Also, relying on a trusted organization, whether
the National Rifle Association or the Sierra Club, can influence
group-based decision-making, as discussed below.
The low cost of entry and efficiency also are significant in the elegislating context. The Internet can be a great leveling force for the
general public as against the moneyed interests, which tend to
dominate political discourse under conventional methods. Those with
more money can hire lobbyists, who are cost prohibitive for more
grass-roots groups. The Internet may be able to empower traditionally
less-represented groups to inexpensively organize and mobilize to
influence elected officials on the same level as their richer
counterparts. 178
While addressing the role of money, we must consider the
cynicism of some who believe the main object of many social media
campaigns is not to encourage public involvement, but rather to raise
funds. 1 There is little doubt that electronic mediums have allowed a
176 Id. at 2833 n.3.
177 See, e.g., Richard Parker, Social and Anti-Social Media, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15,
2012, 9:16 PM), http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/15/social-and-antisocial-medial (noting that the Obama campaign's ability to move beyond "traditional
media" was a big factor in connecting with voters, particularly Hispanics, African
Americans, and voters under thirty).
178 For example, in the October 2012 presidential debate when Mitt Romney used the
phrase "binders full of women," the social media universe exploded. At one point during
the debate, the phrase was mentioned 40,000 times in one minute on social media.
Timothy Stenovec, 'Binders Full of Women': Mitt Romney's Comment Goes Viral,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 16, 2012, 11:33 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10
/16/binders-full-of-women-mitt-rornney-.n_1972337.html. Pay equity and other women's
rights issues immediately became a topic of paramount political importance in the
campaign. Michael D. Shear, DebateMoves Women to Fore in Racefor the White House,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/18/us/politics/obama-and
-romney-focus-on-efforts-to-woo-women.html?_r=0.
179 As most of the Internet campaigns include a "donate" button, some cynics believe
fundraising and not activism is the motivation for many of these campaigns. For example,
the Kony 2012 video, which went viral in early 2012, purported to raise public
consciousness about the atrocities of Ugandan-born rebel leader Joseph Kony, who for
almost twenty years terrorized villagers in at least four countries in central Africa-killing
tens of thousands of adults, turning young boys into soldiers, and turning girls into sex
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broader base of supporters to donate small amounts to a candidate or
cause to counteract large donations from a few. 80 As an example, the

slaves. The video was a fundraising success far exceeding expectations. Kony 2012,
INVISIBLE CHILDREN, invisiblechildren.com/kony/ (last visited July 13, 2013). The
sponsoring group, Invisible Children, received millions of dollars in donations and ran out
of its "Kony Kits" within days, so a website was created for consumers to shop for Kony
2012 t-shirts and other merchandise. SHOP MOS, http://www.shopmos.com/kony-2012
?i=us_1_34684-5336690021 (last visited Feb. 25, 2013). See also Mike Pflanz, Joseph
Kony 2012: Growing Outrage in Uganda over Film, THE TELEGRAPH (Mar. 8, 2012, 4:40
PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/uganda/9131469
/Joseph-Kony-2012-growing-outrage-in-Uganda-over-film.html. ("Invisible Voices has
faced criticism over its finances. Of more than £6 million it spent in 2001, less than E2.3
million was for activities helping people on the ground. The rest went on 'awareness
programmes [sic] and products', (sic] management, media, and others."); Tory Shepherd,
Remember Kony 2012? Well, It's 2013. What happened?, NEWS.COM.AU (Jan. 11, 2013,
6:15 AM), http://www.news.com.aulworld-news/remember-kony-2012-well-its-2013-what
-happened/story-fodir2ev-1226550575923 ("The organisation [sic] which urged grassroots
campaigners to help take down the African warlord Joseph Kony made nearly $20 million
last year with its Kony 2012 campaign. And according to Invisible Children's 2011-12
financial report, the company still has $12.6 million of campaign funds in its coffers after
spending $6.7 million on expenses."). Similarly, interest groups may be using social media
petitions and lobbying efforts to fire up constituents and increase traffic to their Websites.
Some grants require statistics of such Internet traffic as evidence that a potential recipient
of funding is worthy. Therefore, one might cynically conclude that many of the initiators
of these campaigns know that the signatures and letters that they are seeking will have
little to no impact, yet they encourage these campaigns for their own financial benefit.
Addressing this concern in more depth is beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., MARK
SuRMAN & KATHERINE REILLY, SOCIAL SCIENCES RESEARCH COUNCIL, APPROPRIATING
THE INTERNET FOR SOCIAL CHANGE: TOWARDS THE STRATEGIC USE OF NETWORKED
TECHNOLOGIES BY TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS (2003), available
at http://library.uniteddiversity.coop/Effective_-Organising/Appropriating-theInternet_for
_SocialChange.pdf.
No one has yet figured out a reliable and dramatically successful new model for
sustaining online technology and media projects.
In the mean time, the old techniques of donor dependency and extreme
volunteerism are used to keep most projects alive. In some regards, there is
nothing wrong with this. We have known for a very long time that socially
relevant media and communications projects require outside support to provide.
The problem is that donors have both moved to more project based funding and
put pressure on grantees to find new, independent revenue models.
Id. at 75; Dana R. Fisher, The Activism Industry, CBSNEWS.COM (Feb. 11, 2009),
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-215_162-2013172.html?pageNum=l (talking about how
activist organizations cannot afford to do grassroots outreach on their own, so they
outsource it to organizations that specialize in outreach and canvass for many
organizations).
180 For example, a school bus monitor received over $500,000 from Internet supporters
after some teenagers harassed her and the video was posted on YouTube. Meaghan M.
McDermott, FundraisingPasses $500,000 for Victim of Bus Taunting, U.S.A. TODAY,
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-06-2 1/bus-taunt-victim-fund
raising/55729944/1, (last updated June 22, 2012, 5:11 PM).
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Obama campaign used social media to raise $147 million from donors
who gave $200 or less.
Overall, the ability of the party posting Internet data to remain
unknown or unauthenticated and the low cost of entry have mixed
benefits and detriments. It allows the "bypassing [of] traditionally
powerful communication gatekeepers."l82 Instead of having a few
news networks controlled by the government or powerful corporate
interests, the public can receive news from alternative, sometimes
unknown, sources. This enables "Internet users to reconfigure their
access to other people, information, services and technologies."' 8 3
While this process may positively disrupt normal balances of
power and expectations, it also eliminates some of the filtering
functions those gatekeepers performed. -Elimination of the
gatekeepers will require Internet users to be more vigilant in assuring
accuracy, scientific support, or verification.' 84 Transparency can help
because it "enables the electorate to make informed decisions and
give proper weight to different speakers and messages." 8 5
C Type, Speed, and Quality ofInformation Received
"[D]ynamic and instantaneous forms of communication . . .
actually represent/J a return to the tribal era, for network society
displays many of the characteristicsofpreliterateoral societies. "1 86

181The smaller donors of $200 or less accounted for thirty-four percent of Obama's
total receipts from individuals. The less social-media savvy Romney campaign raised only
$39.5 million from such small donors, or eighteen percent of his total receipts from
individuals. Julianna Goldman, Obama Winning Social Media, If #HashtagwarsReally

Matter, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 21, 2012, 9:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10
-22/obama-winning-social-media-if-hashtagwars-really-matter.html.
182 DuTrON & PELTU, supra note 11, at 7.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 5-7.

185 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'~n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010) ("With the
advent of the Internet, prompt disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders and
citizens with the information needed to hold corporations and elected officials accountable
for their positions and supporters. Shareholders can determine whether their corporation's
political speech advances the corporation's interest in making profits, and citizens can see
whether elected officials. are 'in the pocket' of so-called moneyed interests. The First
Amendment protects political speech; and disclosure permits citizens and shareholders to
react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper way. This transparency enables the
electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and
messages.") (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
186 David Howes, e-Legislation: Law-Making in the Digital Age, 47 McGLL L.J. 39,

41-42 (2001).
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Sociologists have documented that Internet rhetoric is more
emotional. 1 Some of this may be due to the stimuli of the Internet;
some to the speed of responses; and still more to anonymity and lack
of accountability. Justice Scalia. used this as an argument against
anonymity in the legislative context:
Requiring people to stand up in public for their political acts fosters
civic courage, without which democracy is doomed. For my part, I
do not look forward to a society which . . . exercises the direct

democracy of initiative and referendum hidden from public scrutiny
and protected from the accountability of criticism.18 8
This section will address how information received electronically
compares to more conventional modes, focusing on distinctions in
type, speed, and quality.
1. Type
It is unlikely that the "We Are All Khaled" website would have
gotten the response it did if it had not included photos of Khaled's
bashed and bloody head. Instead of focusing on "facts and statistics,"
the revolutionaries used this photo and stirring videos to "creat[e] an
emotional bond between the cause and the target audience."1 8 9
One of the Internet's attractions is its ability to communicate in
ways beyond the written word. As Internet speeds increase and video
postings proliferate, more and more users are garnering information
through multimedia-images, music, animations, and videos.
In his article, e-Legislation: Law-Making in the DigitalAge, David
Howes, an anthropology professor at Concordia University, does not
address the process of e-legislating as discussed here. Instead, he
describes the impact of the Internet on legislation from the
perspective of communications studies. He argues:
[B]oth the construction and dissemination of legislation tend to be
inflected by the implicit normative structure of the prevailing mode
of communication (oral, print, or digital).
As cyberspace becomes more interactive, more sensuous, and more
ubiquitous through new developments in network technology, the
way in which legislation is conceptualized and experienced may
187 See Matt Ridley, Internet On, Inhibitions Off Why We Tell All, WALL ST. J., Feb.
18, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204795304577221164189123
608.html.
188 John Doe No. I v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2837 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
189 GHONIM, supra note 2, at 86-87. See also WE ARE ALL KHALED SAID,

http://www.elshaheeed.co.uk/ (last visited July 13, 2013).
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become less and less textual (i.e. informed by the icon of the statute
book) and more like a song, a dance, or even a feast-all traditional
forms of legal expression in oral societies. 190
Howes argues that digital modes more closely follow how humans
have been mentally wired in oral societies in the past. Thus, they are
"motivated by the ubiquity, multisensoriality (or organicity), and
instantaneous-interactive quality of communication." 9 1 Instead of
looking at how existing legal rules may be adapted to cyberspace,
Howes believes cyberspace will fundamentally change the law itself.
For example, modem law has traditionally been text-based. "The
doctrine of legal positivism is shown to derive from a text-based
communications order. The legislative ideals associated with this
doctrine, such as generality, promulgation, clarity and absence of
contradiction, and92top-down authority, all reflect the imprimatur of
the printed text."1
On the other hand, "in pre- and post-typographic (i.e. oral and
digital) communications orders, the predominant legislative values are
flexibility, participation and accessibility, contextuality, and
multicentric authority. These tenets are summed up by the notion of
legal interactivism." 93

What this could mean, in the context of e-legislating, is that more
legislative decisions will be driven by multisensory data that is less
normatively objective or statistical and more experientially based.

Howes, supra note 186, at 42. Howes explains,
Communication on the Internet will hence no longer be limited to disembodied,
linear typed messages and responses but will consist of dynamic, multisensory
interactions between "re-embodied" virtual beings.... With the success of userfriendly software and Web sites, convenience has become another of the defining
characteristics and thus one of the norms of Internet communication. . . . The
advent of electronic communications has ushered in a new age of orality, for
while electronic messages at present still primarily take written form, the
interactive, dialogical character of Internet communication mimics the qualities
of oral communicatiop. . . . In an oral society the law is personal: it is always
conveyed by one person to another, and hence never has the depersonalized
objective character of a written text.
Id. at 46, 48, 51, 54.
191 Howes, supra note 186, at Preface.
190

192 Id.
193 Id.
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2. Speed

Many, including the Supreme Court, have acknowledged that "the
Internet evolves at a rapid pace." 19 4 While this quote referred to the
changes in electronic technologies, it also reflects the dynamic and
instantaneous communication that the Internet now makes possible.
The speed at which information is shared represents one of the
unique attributes of the Internet. Thus, because of simultaneous
Tweeting, speech is defined as it is in progress rather than viewed or
digested in its entirety upon completion. This can fundamentally
change the message the presenter intended, illustrated when Marco
Rubio awkwardly lurched off screen to grab a drink of water during
his rebuttal to President Obama's 2013 State of the Union address. As
comedian Stephen Colbert observed, "Don't worry, Senator Rubio,
nobody noticed-that you gave a speech."195
The fast, flexible, and sophisticated targeting that the Internet
allows was critical in Revolution 2.0 and even more so in the Obama
campaign. This agility empowers groups that might otherwise be
outgunned to make more surgical and strategic strikes. This may
prove pivotal in the context of e-legislating. In the past, only those
with enough resources to have lobbyists covering the Capitol fulltime could have their voices heard during critical votes. Now, social
media puts a broad public spotlight on everything that Congress is
doing.
Speed also has its drawbacks. "[T]he 'tyranny of real-time'round-the-clock, round-the-world news and opinion from a multitude
of sources . . . [is] putting pressure on slower, more deliberative

governance processes." Therefore, in the e-legislating context, it will
be best if systems can be established "to react in Internet time and in
the Internet space . . . to respond rapidly to (mis)information

disseminated online."'
Part IV below illustrates some of the
problems when the Internet mobilizes mass action without providing
full or accurate information.

194 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 671 (2004).

195 The Colbert Report (Comedy Central broadcast Feb. 13, 2013), available at
http://www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-report-videos/423831/february-13-2013/state-of
-the-rubio.
196 DUTTON & PELTU, supra note 11, at 7 (quoting RICHARD GRANT, OXFORD
INTERNET INSTITUTE, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF DIPLOMACY: NEGOTIATING WITH THE
INTERNET, 5 (2004)).
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3. Quality
Both citizen initiative and social media campaigns might be wellintentioned and motivated by genuine concerns, but most often they
are persuasive, rather than educational, and consequently rely on a
certain degree of manipulation. As some scholars have noted in the
context of e-rulemaking campaigns:
[These campaigns use] techniques that rhetoricians and marketers
have long used to motivate people to take a desired action: appeals
to emotion and exploitation of fears and insecurities; hyperbolic,
sometimes inflammatory, language and imagery; selective
deployment of facts and strategic, sometimes misleading,
juxtapositions or omissions of information.1 97
In a citizen initiative campaign, those with money have a distinct
advantage because they can bombard the airwaves with emotional and
sometimes misleading ads.'9 To counteract this, some governments
have enacted reforms that require the dissemination of objective
summaries of the ballot measures. In addition, these ballot pamphlets
may allow proponents and opponents of an initiative equal
opportunities to make their case for or against the measure.
The relative lack of expense in mounting an Internet e-legislating
campaign can be an equalizing and positive factor. This is significant
because, unlike citizen initiatives and the election campaigns, which
run in regular cycles, e-legislating requires daily diligence as
measures move through Congress. The ability to mount social media
campaigns on a daily basis also means they need more "pop" to catch
our attention among the daily competing messages in our inboxes.
Unfortunately for citizens who want to make an informed choice,
these campaigns also do not have neutral forums, like the ballot
pamphlet, to allow balanced presentation of both sides. Furthermore,
social media campaigns have little incentive to provide their targets
with follow-up links to find more balanced or complete coverage of
the issues. Consequently, even if citizens want to know more, it can
be very time consuming and challenging for them to find more
comprehensive information to make informed choices.
The effort to have campaigns stand out can lead to
oversimplification of complex issues.199 Citizen initiatives may
197 Rulemaking vs. Democracy, supra note 45, at 141-42.
198 K.K. DuVivier, State Ballot Initiatives in the Federal Preemption Equation:A
Medical MarijuanaCase Study, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 221, 245-46 (2005).
199 Oversimplification might be appropriate in the Joseph Kony situation. Beth Rowen,
The World's Most-Wanted Fugitives, INFOPLEASE, http://infoplease.com/world/statistics
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include pages. of graduate-level language,200 but the campaigns
reduce those issues to sound bites and slogans, and the citizen's
choice is ultimately a simple "yes" or "no." Similarly, social media
campaign messages must fit on a webpage or within the 140
characters of a Tweet.
The oversimplification of complex issues into "starkly us-or-them,
all-or-nothing terms" 2 0 1 to encourage mass action has resulted in
bizarre outcomes. Lack of citizen education about the issues upon
which they are voting and misleading language has influenced
citizens to vote contrary to their intent. Voters can "substitute voting
cues for substantive policy knowledge," which can result in decisions
that are not always "welfare-improving." 2 0 2
While this section focused on the information citizens receive in elegislating campaigns, the following will address citizen responses to
that information.
D. Type & Quality of Citizen Response
"[L]ow-threshold civic engagement" 2 0 3
Some applaud virtual public participation as a positive trend-a
signal that individuals are turning away from their personal needs,
/most-wanted-fugitives.html (last visited July 13, 2013). The International Criminal
Court's designation of Kony ast the most wanted war criminal provided independent
verification that action against him is just. However, other issues arguably have less
obvious villains. For example, the Keystone XL pipeline is controversial, but stopping the
exportation of the tar sand oils to the United States will not prevent Canada from exporting
the oil to China instead. Did Obama Push Canada into China's Arms by Rejecting the

Keystone Pipeline?, THE WEEK, (July 25, 2012), http://theweek.com/article/index/231023
/did-obama-push-canada-into-chinas-arms-by-rejecting-the-keystone-pipeline.
200 MAGLEBY, supra note 108.
201 Rulemaking vs. Democracy, supra note 45, at 141-42.

202 Craig M. Burnett, Elizabeth Garrett & Matthew D. McCubbins, The Dilemma of
Direct Democracy, 9 ELECTION L.J. 305, 305 (2010). Here is a specific example: In an

effort that seemed designed to confuse voters, Occidental Petroleum (Oxy) introduced a
ballot initiative in 1988 to defeat a competing initiative it opposed, Proposition 0, which
would bar Oxy's drilling beneath a coastal community near Los Angeles. Occidental's
competing initiative, Proposition P, permitted Oxy's coastal drilling, but was marketed as
opposing offshore drilling. Proposition 0 passed with 52.3% of the vote; Proposition P
failed with only 34.2% of the vote. Tedd Vollmer & Tracy Wood, Anti-Drilling Prop. 0
Wins as Prop. P Loses, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1988, http://articles.latimes.com/1988-11-09
/news/mn-444_1_drilling-project.
203 Bill Sherman, Your Mayor, Your "Friend":Public Officials, Social Networking,
and the Unmapped New PublicSquare, 31 PACE L. REV. 95, 102 (2011) (addressing local

government restrictions on social networking and fears of violating campaign finance,
open meeting, FOI, and government ethics laws).
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even if briefly, to attempt a measure of altruism or personal
responsibility. At least one study showed that Internet "information
exchange" correlated positively with "life contentment" in contrast to
Internet "social recreation," which correlated negatively.204 Sadly, the
same study found that the increased political engagement fostered by
online political discussions did not correlate to "increased levels of
political knowledge" 205
The fundamentals of democracy assume a knowledgeable public,
one that is capable of representing its own self-interest effectively.
A healthy democracy, then, should see tandem movement between
political knowledge and political participation. Here we find that
while online group membership predicts increased levels of offline
political participation, we do not see an equally significant effect on
the levels of political knowledge. 20 6
When the authors examined the social media wall posts in the
study database, they found most of the posts to be opinionated,
incoherent, or lacking support. These posts were low quality,
reinforcing existing prejudices, and exposing group members to little
new, well-articulated, enlightening, or educational information. 207
These findings are consistent with others who have concluded that:
[I]dealists hoping that social networks would enable a high-minded
process of deliberative democracy are likely to be disappointed204 Jessica T. Feezell, Meredith Conroy & Mario Guerrero, Facebook is. . Fostering
Political Engagement: A Study of Online Social Networking Groups and Offline

Participation, Presentation at the American Political Science Association Meeting 3
(2009) (citing D.V. Shah, N. Kwak & Holbert 2001 for the conclusions about contentment,
etc.). A study of 790 randomly selected wall posts by 455 undergraduate students at a
public university in California (nearly seventy percent of which declared Political Science
as their major) to assess the quality of online political discussion groups and the effects on
political engagement found the following:
1) Online groups encourage offline political participation-this result is
consistent with a 2008 study that also showed the chat rooms, political email
correspondence, and online news exposure predict higher voting rates; and
2) "[Ilncreased online political group membership ... [has] not increased levels
of political knowledge."
Id. at 3-5.

205 Feezell, supra note 204, at 9, 16. A study of eParticipation in the EU also concluded
that two key obstacles encountered included (1) "lack of awareness and information for the
citizens about what is being decided" and (2) lack of the necessary "expertise and
knowledge sophistication often required to make a contribution to arguments." Thanassis
Chrissafis & Mechthild Rohen, European eParticipationDevelopments: From Ad Hoc
Experiences Towards Mass Scale Engagement, 2 EJOURNAL EDEMOCRACY & OPEN

Gov'T 89, 91-92 (2010).
206 Feezell, supra note 204, at 15-16.
207 Id.
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after all, study after study has demonstrated that online discourse is
factually unreliable, consists of opinion rather than objective
information, creates "echo chambers" in which people only talk to
or hear from those who already agree with them, and therefore
reinforce polarization in politics. 0 8
Assuming that citizens would take the time if a proper online
forum were created, some argue that politicians and public officials
can facilitate civil discussions and debates by establishing public
online spaces and the rules by which they are moderated, just as all
other democratic forums have been governed by rules of order. These
forums might serve a function similar to the balanced or neutral ballot
pamphlets created for citizen initiated measures. The tricky part
would be structuring and monitoring discussions to avoid "sabotage
and distort[ion]" and "to defuse flare-ups and disruptions." 2 09
Others place blame for the decrease in political knowledge not on
those disseminating the information but upon the lack of "cognitive
investment" 2 10 of those gathering it. In an e-electioneering context,
research shows that voters have little incentive to invest the time to
conduct sufficient research to choose candidates for office who reflect
their preferences on pivotal issues.211 Any type of public participation
is valued in electoral democracy as "[v]oters are asked for outcomes,
not reasons."2 12 Consequently, some studies have concluded that an
208 Sherman, supra note 203, at 102 (quoting SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0, supra note
32, at 25); DUTTON & PELTU, supra note 11, at 21 ("Unregulated forums tend to become
boxing rings for the extremes of an argument.").
209 DUTTON & PELTU, supra note 11, at 21 (suggesting the stage at which online
consultation takes place-saying e-petitions are most appropriate for highlighting issues
not yet widely debated). Also, "web design tools . . . include advice to citizens on how to
engage with government officials in non-abusive ways, while clearly making the points
they wish to raise." Id. at 22.
210 Rulemaking vs. Democracy, supra note 45, at 135. "[T]he participatory model of
electoral democracy contains fewer incentives for citizens to make the cognitive
investment needed to form higher information or higher thought preferences. The result, as
voting research repeatedly shows, isthat many voters are unaware of, or mistaken about,
the record and positions of candidates for major office even on policy issues that they
identify as important." Id. These political outcomes are legitimate because there is no
remedy to challenge them. Id. at 136; see also MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT
KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNow ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 263-64
(1997); MARTIN P. WATTENBERG, THE RISE OF CANDIDATE-CENTERED POLITICS:
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS OF THE 1980s, at 124-26 (1992); Kate Kenski & Kathleen Hall
Jamieson, Issue Knowledge and Perceptions of Agreement in the 2004 Presidential
GeneralElection, 36 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 243 (2006).
211 Rulemaking vs. Democracy, supra note 45, at 135.
212 Id. "Even if exit polls reveal widespread ignorance, misinformation, or mistake, the
outcome is legitimate so long as ballots are freely cast by eligible voters." Id.
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average of twenty-five percent of voters makes the "wrong"
213
choice.
But this "wrong choice" conclusion might be challenged. Citizens
make their choices about representatives on the basis of a number of
criteria other than on a candidate's stance with respect to one or two
issues. Arguably, voters' choices with respect to citizen initiatives or
e-legislating should more closely align with their preferences.
However, even in the context of citizen initiatives, there is
214
evidence of voter confusion. Despite single-subject restrictions,
much legislation is complex. Furthermore, choices can be confused
when individuals also feel affiliation with a group. Interest groups and
political parties are increasingly becoming involved with citizen
initiatives and e-legislating campaigns. 215 As citizens learn of
endorsements of particular pieces of legislation, it becomes more
likely that voters will base their decisions on group-framed
216
preferences.
Social media decisions may be even more prone to a lack of
cognitive investment because of two fundamental characteristics of
digital communication: convenience and high speed. For example, the
current modus operandi for many e-legislating campaigns is to send
individuals a message-by link, e-mail, Facebook, Twitter, etc.-that
includes a pre-composed form letter or comment.217 The recipient
213 See, e.g., Richard R. Lau et al., An Exploration of Correct Voting in Recent U.S
PresidentialElections, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 395, 396-97 (2008) (analyzing data from 1972

through 2004 presidential elections, and defining a vote as "correct" if it was cast for the
candidate whose expressed issue positions most closely matched the voter's collection of
expressed, weighted preferences). Lau et al. found that the proportion of "incorrect" votes
averaged twenty-five percent of all voters and reached a highpoint of forty-nine percent in
the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan; in several presidential elections, they concluded, the
incidence and direction of incorrect voting affected the outcome. Id. at 401-02, 406. Cf
Larry M. Bartels, Homer Gets a Tax Cut: Inequality and Public Policy in the American

Mind, 3 PERSP. ON POL. 15 (2005) (examining disconnect between voters' knowledge of
and expressed views about the increasing gap beiween rich and poor and their support for
regressive Bush administration cuts in income and estate taxes).

214 Michael D. Gilbert, Single Subject Rules and the Legislative Process, 67 U. PITT. L.
REv. 803 (2006).
215 K.K. DuVivier, Out ofthe Bottle: The Genie ofDirect Democracy, 70 ALB. L. REV.

1045, 1049-50 (2007) (noting that the parties have used the initiative process to boost
turnout for candidates).
216 Surprisingly, at least one study found that "better-informed voters ... are no more
likely to make reasoned decisions than those who are, by our measure, uninformed."
Burnett, Garrett & McCubbins, supra note 202, at 305.
217 Some groups encourage personalization of the letters to give them more weight, but
the vast number of identical submissions suggests that few take the time to do so.
Rulemaking vs. Democracy, supra note 45, at 130 (citing Stuart W. Shulman, The Case
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need not read the letter before sending it to legislators or making a
donation to a cause.
Statistics show that virtual participation declines with any
additional time or financial investment.2 18 So while some elegislating requests require the senders to input personal data, many
make it easier by storing that data and requiring a single click on
one's electronic device to deliver a message to one's representatives.
Contrast this investment of time to what, in the past, required
educating oneself on the issue enough to compose a letter, finding the
proper address and a stamp, and traveling to a box or post office to
get your letter into the mail. The current electronic activism is so easy
and involves such a low-time-investment that it has been given the
derogatory labels of "slacktivism" 2 19 or "clicktivism." 2 2 0
Consequently, some argue that those responding to electronic
campaigns base their positions less on objective information or
deliberation, and instead on decision-making that is either (1)
"spontaneous," meaning "rapid, low-thought extrapolations from the
individual's general knowledge, underlying value system, and
worldview" or (2) "group-framed," which are "based on information
. . . provided by a group with which the individual feels
affiliation." 2 2 1
Against Mass E-mails: Perverse Incentives and Low Quality Public Participationin U.S.
FederalRulemaking, 1 POL'Y & INTERNET 23, 34, fig.4, 35 (2009)).
218 Cameron Chapman, 10 Usability Tips Based on Research Studies, Six REVISIONS

(Sept. 15, 2010), http://sixrevisions.com/usabilityaccessibility/10-usability-tips-based-on
-research-studies/.
219 Technologically-assisted forms of public participation are sometimes referred to as
"slacktivism," a term used to "describe feel-good online activism that has zero political or
social impact." Evgeny Morozov, The Brave New World ofSlacktivism, NET.EFFECT (May

19, 2009), http://neteffect.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/05/19/the-brave-new-world-of
slacktivism.
220 By "liking" an online messaging campaign through Facebook, or by clicking a link
embedded in an e-mail from your favorite nonprofit organization, clicktivists do nothing
more than express support of a cause or generate an identical copy of a letter that is then
electronically disseminated. It is impossible to determine whether participants in digital
activism actively enhanced their "carbon-copy" submissions to reflect their own personal
concerns or impacts, or whether they were content to simply click on the link and submit
the comments pre-generated for them.
221 Rulemaking vs. Democracy, supra note 45, at 130. Farina first sets out a typology of

public preferences based on how they are informed: (1) Spontaneous Preferences; (2)
Group-Framed Preferences; (3) Informed Preferences-"based on exposure to, and
consideration of, reasonably full and accurate factual information"; and (4) Adaptive
Preferences-"informed preferences modified by an assessment of the larger sociopolitical environment, legal and organizational constraints, and the claims of competing
preferences [etc.] . . . [i.e.] what is workable over what is ideal." Id. at 132-34.
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Spontaneous or impulse-based decisions are especially susceptible
to the emotion that online communication fosters, so some might feel
that group-framed decision-making is more legitimate. When Alexis
de Tocqueville toured the United States in the 18th century, he
observed that Americans "ultimately look upon public association as
the universal, or in a manner the sole means, which men can employ
to accomplish the different purposes they may have in view. .'. . The
art of association then becomes, as I have said before, the mother of
action, studied and applied by all." 222 Since that time, U.S. political
engagement has frequently been spurred by group membership.
In 2000, Robert Putnam observed a decline in offline groupspaired by growth of online groups for civic engagement.
A
problem with this shift is that the anonymity of the Internet, as
indicated in Part II.B above, can distort or hide a group's true identity
and mislead citizens to trust that group's statements.
Furthermore,
as discussed in Part II.C above, the goal of e-legislating campaigns is
to spur supporters into action. Because providing more balanced facts
may be less effective in motivating members, there may be a tendency
for some groups to oversimplify and to be inflammatory and selective
in the short space they have for their messages.

"It's a new day ....

E. Impact
Braceyourselves.

,225

Few can argue that it is a bad thing to have citizens pay attention in
a democracy-whether representative or direct. There is so much
competition for our attention that it has become a praiseworthy event
when someone turns away from sports team rankings or
entertainment, even briefly, and becomes concerned with making a
222 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 639 (1835) (Bantam Dell ed.

2004).
223 ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2000).
224 For example, The Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, one of the most recognized
adversaries of what was hoped to be the first offshore wind farm in the United States, Cape
Wind, raised $11 million in 2006. Ninety percent of its funds were donated by Bill Koch
and his wealthy friends, such as Paul Fireman of Reebok and Michael Egan, son to the
founder of EMC Corp. Koch's corporation, the Oxbow Corporation, makes over $3.7
billion in sales annually through the sale of petroleum coke and coal mining. Bill Koch:
The Dirty Money Behind Cape Wind Opposition, GREENPEACE, http://www.greenpeace
.org/usa/Globallusg/binaries/2010/bill-koch-the-dirty-money-beh.pdf (last visited July 15,
2013).
225 Weisman, supra note 1 (quoting Senator Chris Dodd).
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decision about world or local issues.226 E-legislating, like citizen
initiatives, can stimulate interest and debate about policy issues,
reduce apathy and alienation, and increase political participation.227
One of the biggest questions is whether e-legislating will be any
more effective than conventional grassroots lobbying campaigns. For
any number of reasons-time, effort, a sense of not being effectiveU.S. citizens have participated less, rather than more, in President
Obama's past invitations for them to become part of the policymaking process. For example, Candidate Obama received up to five
million votes on some of the ideas submitted online before he became
228
but when he tried similar participatory activities after he
president,
took office, the number of participants dropped to as low as two
thousand.2 29
Politicians must pay attention to e-electioneering campaigns
because citizen actions can translate into real consequences. For
example, politicians who ignore constituents can be voted out.
Similarly, most citizen initiative votes result in legislation or
amendment of the state constitution, which, in many cases, state
legislators have no power to change. In contrast, citizen input through
the process of e-legislating is not binding. So how does, or should, it
impact members of Congress? Because this is a new question, this
section starts by looking to the extensive scholarship about assessing
the appropriate role for social media in the administrative erulemaking context.230 It then looks at how e-legislating embodies
some of the attributes of e-electioneering that might make legislators
pay more attention to social media for e-legislating than they might in
the e-rulemaking context.
226 DuVivier, supra note 198, at 236-38.
227 Id. at 236-38. See also Manabu Sacki, Direct Democracy Paradox: State Fiscal
Policies in the UnitedStates and the Threat ofDirect Initiatives,23 REV. POL'Y RES. 915,

915 (2006) (listing some of the benefits of initiatives and citing Dye, 2000 pp. 40-42 and
Schmidt, 1989).
228 Johnston, supra note 13, at 162. See BITTLE, HALLER & KADLEC, supra note 143;

Lee, supra note 143.
229 Johnston, supra note 13, at 162.

230 This discussion addresses social media input in the "notice and comment"
rulemaking process, which anticipates and mandates public input. Administrative
agencies, alternatively, sometimes take on a quasi-judicial role that is meant to be a nonpolitical decision-making process similar to that of the courts. Many administrative land
use decisions-like the Keystone Excel Pipeline or approval of land use plans-would fit
in this quasi-judicial category (e.g., Interior Board of Land Appeals) unless NEPA or
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA) public comment
requirements are triggered.
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In a 2011 article, Nina Mendelson argued that agencies receiving a
high volume of comments "occasionally acknowledge the number of
lay comments and the sentiments they express [but] they very rarely
appear to give them any significant weight." 2 3 1 "Interviews with
agency rule writers show that agencies do not value and often openly
resent form letters." 2 32 This may not be surprising considering that in
a March 2011 rulemaking on Mercury and Air Toxics Standards, for
example, EPA employees had to process about 3000 public comments
per day.233 However, the problem is worse than simply
"systematically discounting [social media comments]"; 2 3 4 sometimes
mass and electronic form-letter comments are "derided by agency
staff."2 35
Mendelson specifically advocates that agencies make more of an
effort to be responsive, not only to technical comments, but also to
"value-focused" or "value-laden" comments.2 3 6 Alternatively, she

231 Nina A. Mendelson, Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of E-Mail, 79 GEO.

WASH. L. REV. 1343, 1363-64 (2011).
232 Schlosberg et al., supra note 45, at 143.
233 EPA Fact Sheet: Mercury and Air Toxic Standards-Adjustmentsfrom Proposal to
Final, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/mats/pdfs/2011122 IMATS

adjustmentsfs.pdf [hereinafter EPA Fact Sheet] (last visited July 15, 2013). The EPA
claimed to have received over 900,000 public comments. Id. Considering nine-month
comment period, the agency would have had to analyze an average of 100,000 comments
each month or approximately 3,000 per day. See also Lindsay McNamara, Mercury and
Air Toxics Standards (MATS) Series Part I: Overview, SIERRA CLUB: DELAWARE

CHAPTER (Oct. 9, 2012), http://delaware.sierraclub.org/content/mercury-and-air-toxics
-standards-mats-series-part-i-overview; News Releases from Headquarters: EPA Issues
First National Standardsfor Mercury Pollution from Power Plants/ Historic 'Mercury
and Air Toxics Standards' Meet 20-Year Old Requirement to Cut Dangerous Smokestack
Emissions, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (Dec. 21, 2011), http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa

/admpress.nsf/bd4379a92ceceeac8525735900400c27/bd8b3f37edf5716d8525796d005dd(
86%210penDocument [hereinafter EPA News Release].
234 Mendelson, supra note 231, at 1346.

235 Id. at 1363. Additionally, agencies frequently treat multiple postings through letters,
postcards, or e-mails with little real engagement as evidenced by the lack of agency
response to mass comments. Id. at 1343, 1363-64. Additionally, federal agencies should
work with developers of social media to enhance processing capabilities. The same
technology that negatively impacts timelines could help expedite the review process.
Congress should direct funding toward research and development, partnering with social
media developers, to develop technology that facilitates effective public participation. Erulemaking, the use of technology to help facilitate public participation in agency
rulemaking, may "have the potential to enhance . . . public understanding of and
involvement in rulemaking." Id.
236 The "value-focused" and "value-laden" terminology is Mendelson's. Examples she
provides include "whether reduced pollution is worth higher electricity bills or whether the
risk presented by a convenient infant bath seat is tolerable." Id. at 1371. These types of
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notes, "[A]gencies should more candidly and publicly acknowledge
that participation in rulemaking can serve only a limited function."2 3 7
The second alternative-of relegating social media comments to a
limited function-appears to be what Cynthia R. Farina and members
of the Cornell eRulemaking Initiative advocate in a 2012 article.2 3 8
Farina argues that this limited function approach is more in line with
the goals of the administrative rulemaking process. Even if new
interactive technologies, such as Web 2.0, will allow "democracy on
steroids"239 to assist in processing tsunamis of rule comments, there
are other reasons not to place much weight on the growing quantities
of input. Farina argues, "Rulemaking is not supposed to be a
plebiscite." 2 4 0 The rulemaking process is legitimate only if based on a
"formally
transparent
process
of reasoned
[data-driven]

deliberation." 2 4 1
Mendelson anticipated this response by noting "agency officials
may see themselves as operating in an atmosphere of rational,
technocratic analysis."2 42 Yet, Mendelson raised the issue that
regulatory decisions are still "heavily value-laden, even when they
also require deployment of scientific or other specialized

knowledge." 2 4 3

comments are contrasted to those that are "sophisticated" and "advance the most technical
concerns." Id. at 1362.
237 Id. at 1346-47.
238 Rulemaking vs. Democracy, supra note 45.
239 Id. at 128.

240 Id. at 131 & n.37 ("Several scholars have expressed concern about e-rulemaking
precisely because the kind of participation it evokes might push agencies towards
plebiscitary decisionmaking."). See, e.g., David Schlosberg & John S. Dryzek, Digital
Democracy: Authentic or Virtual? 15 ORG. & ENV'T 332 (2002); Bill Funk, The Public
Needs a Voice in Policy.But is Involving the Public in Rulemaking a Workable Idea? CPR

BLOG (Apr. 13, 2010), http://progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfn?idBlog-F74D5F86-B
44E-2CBB-ED1507624B63809E; cf Jim Rossi, ParticipationRun Amok: The Costs of
Mass Participationfor Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 173

(1997) (examining problems in administrative contexts beyond rulemaking).
241 Rulemaking vs. Democracy, supra note 45, at 135.
242 Mendelson, supra note 231, at 1371.
243 Rulemaking vs. Democracy, supra note 45 (Farina commenting on Mendelson's

point), at 132; see also Mendelson, supra note 231, at 1371; Emily Hammond Meazell,
Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and Judicial Review as Translation of Agency

Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733, 736 (2011); Stephen Zavestoski, Stuart W. Shulman &
David Schlosberg, Democracy and the Environment on the Internet: Electronic Citizen
Participationin Regulatory Rulemaking, 31 Sci., TECH., & HUM. VALUES 383 (2006);
Mariano-Florentino Cu611ar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411,

461-68 (2005).
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The remedy that the system has provided for challenging
administrative decisions reflects normative weighting of priorities.
In the rulemaking context, a decision can be changed on judicial
review, but based on limited criteria only. 2 45 "Peter Strauss has
written compellingly of the importance of the culture of
administrative legality, whose norms impel those who write the rules
(and ultimately those who defend them in court) to ustify regulatory
outcomes on more than bare political preference." 2 Farina goes on

244 Mendelson acknowledges:
[J]udicial review requirements provide agencies with an incentive to take
technical comments more seriously than value-focused comments. . . . [I]n

applying the arbitrary and capricious review standard, judges often focus
explicitly on the rational connection between the "facts found" and the "choices
made" by an agency in rulemaking. Consequently, an agency's failure to
acknowledge these sorts of issues may be vacated on judicial review. . . .
[E]fforts to argue that agencies are obligated to follow the weight of preferences
in the comments have been roundly-and appropriately-rejected, as with one
opinion, where the court wrote that agency rulemaking is not a process in which
"the majority of commenters prevail by sheer weight of numbers."
Mendelson, supra note 231, at 1370.
245 Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006). The APA
states:
The reviewing court shall(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
found to be(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short
of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections
556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an
agency hearing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to
trial de novo by the reviewing court.
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record
or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of
prejudicial error.
Id. § 706 (1), (2)(A)-(F).
246 Rulemaking vs. Democracy, supra note 45, at 139 (citing Peter L. Strauss, Overseer,
or "The Decider"?: The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 696
(2007)).
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to explain that "[r]easoned decisionmaking requires technocratic
rationality" and not electoral democracy.2 4 7
So how does this analysis translate to e-legislating? As with erulemaking, the citizen comments in the e-legislating context are not
binding votes. In fact, legislators often cannot tell if they are receiving
a distorted sampling of public interest. In elections, whether for
representatives or for a citizen initiative issue, the one-voter-one-vote
rule prevails. In the contexts that social media is currently used-such
as lobbying or rulemaking-there is rarely, if ever, any restriction on
voting multiple times.
All evidence indicates that multiple voting is prevalent in social
media campaigns. Some multiple voting may be unintentional.
Because of different solicitations from different sources, it is possible
that one person will sign a petition or send the same letter multiple
times.
Other instances of multiple voting are deliberate. In a 2009 study,
Stuart Shulman coined the term "plebers" in order to "describe
commenters who are contributing to the plebiscitary notion of
electronic rulemaking by sending two or more e-mails." 2 8 In some of
Shulman's studies, plebers accounted for more than half of the total
comments received. Furthermore, Shulman's work identified a few
"Super-Plebers" who submitted more than 100 comments from a
single e-mail address.249 Unless there is some way to distinguish
input from single individuals as opposed to input from plebers, any
conclusions based on the number of electronic messages from an edemocracy campaign must be suspect.2 5 0
247 Rulemaking vs. Democracy, supra note 45, at 139. Farina's recommendations
include three principles:
Principle 1: No Bread and Circuses-do "not actively facilitate public participation
that [the government] does not value." Id. at 150.
Principle 2: Abandon the Equal Treatment Norm-tailor information to different
participant needs. Id. at 156-58.
Principle 3: Means Should Change; Ends Should Not-do not make participation
too easy. "[L]owest common-denominator participation system design" should not
be the goal. Id. at 160-61.
248 Shulman, supra note 45, at 35.
249 Id. at 35-36. One pleber sent the same comment 314 times. Id. at 36.
250 As noted above, confusion about the content might also make the results suspect.
Because of errors, it may not effectively "gauge . . . citizen value preferences."
Rulemaking vs. Democracy, supra note 45, at 142. "A reasonable agency, in short, would
assume that mass comments suffer from the kinds of fundamental defects in information
quality and deliberative judgment that would (justifiably) prompt judicial reversal were
such flaws found in its own decisionmaking." Id. at 143.
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Whether it is because of the possibility of multiple voting or simply
because of other social media characteristics, initial empirical data
shows that legislators, just like administrative agencies, tend to
discount high volumes of social media comments in the legislating
context. Yet the basis for the screening process is different. Agency
decision-making is structured to be objective, so it is arguably
reasonable to filter out "value-laden" input. In contrast, legislating is
more like e-electioneering. These choices reflect a society's values, so
legislators may have more of an obligation than an administrative
agency to respond to citizen input on values. Large numbers of
comments can reflect the intensity of those values.
Furthermore, legislators are more politically attuned to the risks of
ignoring mass public input if they are subject to redlection. If they
fear political consequences, they are more likely than agency
personnel to respond at least in some fashion.251 This means elegislating may have the potential to shift balances from those with
power and money to those with little of either, from large
corporations to non-profit groups, and from the entrenched few to the
252
many.
But legislator responses are calculated. For example, empirical data
shows that legislators give different weight to emails from different
groups-placing higher value on input from constituents than from
253
interest groups.
Furthermore, in contrast to the threat of an
immediate election in the e-electioneering context, legislators may be
more willing to take the risk of ignoring the desires of constituents
who are not large donors in the context of e-legislating because the
consequences are more remote.
Finally, Organizing for Action has not limited its efforts to
electronic communications with Congress. Instead, social media has
opened up the possibility of flash mobs and demonstrations to create
251 In saying that some agency personnel deride mass comments, Cu61lar is talking
about letters to agencies, which do not always give form letters the same weight as an
individualized letter. Cu6llar, supra note 243, at 421-22. In contrast, legislators are more
likely to take note of a high volume of letters, which could "entice legislators" to rebuke
the agency and force the agency to reconsider the rule. Id.
252 Emily Flynn Vencat, The Big Power Shift, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 28, 2007, 7:00 PM),

http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2007/01/28/the-big-power-shift.html
(noting
how the World Economic Forum in Davos focused less on the geographical power shift
from West to East, but more on how the digital revolution is shifting power from
traditional institutions and the domains of nation-states and megacorporations into the
hands of the masses).
253 Lilliard E. Richardson, Jr. & Christopher A. Cooper, E-mail Communication and the
Policy Process in the State Legislature, 34 POL'Y STUD. J. 113, 126 (2006).
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timely and focused political pressure. It is much easier to ignore
thousands of protesters on the computer than it is to ignore thousands
of protestors on the streets outside one's office.

IV
E-LEGISLATING IN ACTION

Although it may represent the first conversion of an eelectioneering campaign morphing into an ongoing e-legislating
campaign, Organizing for Action is not the first, or only, use of the
Internet to influence legislating. A dramatic example of the
phenomenon of e-legislating occurred approximately a year before
Organizing for Action was created. In January of 2012, over 100,000
254
websites
participated in a protest against the proposed "Stop
Online Piracy Act" (SOPA) in the House and the companion "Protect
IP Act of 2011". (PIPA) in the Senate.2 55 The SOPA experience will
be used here to illustrate how each of the five characteristics
described in the previous section may play out in the context of elegislation. To some, the results may be inspiring, and to others,
alarming.
A. The SOPA Protest Chronology
The SOPA bill, introduced by Republican Representative Lamar
Smith in late October of 2011, was a complex, seventy-eight-page
measure attempting to protect intellectual property rights by boosting
256
enforcement, especially against foreign websites.
The bill had
broad support among prominent corporations, law firms, most major
media companies, and businesses in America, including ABC, CBS,
Comcast/NBC Universal, Capitol Records, the NFL, Time Warner,

254 Leo Kelion, SOPA: Sites Go Dark as Part ofAnti-PiracyLaw Protests,BBC NEWS

(Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-16612628. Although only 7000
sites went dark, 115,000 participated in the strikes in some way (45,000 of these were on
Wordpress.com). The January 18 Blackout / Strike in Numbers and Screenshots, FIGHT

FOR THE FUTuRE, http://sopastrike.com/numbers/ (last visited July 15, 2013).
255 Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter SOPA],
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dl12:h.r.03261. The Senate had a
companion bill with the full name of "Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic
Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act of 2011" (PIPA). S. 968, 112th Cong.
(2011). Because most of the press coverage used the SOPA acronym, this Article will do
the same.
256 SOPA, supra note 255.
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3M, Adidas, Random House, and many others.
Advocates of
SOPA claimed that the bill would expand U.S. law enforcement to
fight online trafficking of intellectual property. These curbs on
counterfeiting and piracy were said to support 2.2 million jobs in the
U.S. movie industry alone. 2 58
About two weeks after SOPA was introduced, 'web giants,
including Google, Facebook, Twitter, PayPal, eBay, Mozilla, Yahoo,
AOL, LinkedIn, and Zynga, ("SOPA opponents") wrote Congress
objecting that the bill would "pose a serious risk to our industry's
continued track record of innovation and job-creation"259 As is often
the case for legislation between competing business interests, many of
the SOPA opponents were web giants in their own right, such as
Google and Facebook, and had "political muscle of their own, with
in-house lobbying shops and trade associations just like traditional
media's." 260 Following the age-old legislative dance in Congress, the
SOPA opponents had sponsors introduce an alternative bill, the
Online Protection and Enforcement of Digital Trade Act (OPEN
Act).261
But the opponents could see that their use of traditional lobbying
tactics was faltering. SOPA appeared destined to pass. It had cleared a
Senate committee and had bipartisan support in the House.2 62 In late

257 For a complete list of the bill's supporters, see David Harris-Gershon, THE LISTEvery Corporation & Organization Supporting SOPA, Care of the House Judiciary
Committee, DAILY KOS (Dec. 21, 2011, 4:45 PM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2011
/12/21/1047747/-THE-LIST-Every-Corporation-Organization-Supporting-SOPA-Care-of
-the-House-Judiciary-Committee.
258 Jim Puzzanghera, PIPA Anti-PiracyBill Vote Postponedin Senate, L.A. TIMES (Jan.
20, 2012, 6:51 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2012/01/pipa-anti-piracy
-bill-vote-postponed-senate.html.
259 Mary Quinn O'Connor, CensoringClicks or Saving the Web? SOPA HearingMay
Shape Net's Future, FOX NEWS (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/techl2011/12
/15/censoring-your-clicks-saving-web-sopa-hearing-may-shape-nets-future/#ixzz2LdeGa
Xpk (quoting an Open Letter to Washington).
260 Weisman, supra note 1. See also Christopher S. Stewart, Geoffrey A. Fowler & Sam
Schechner, New, Old Media Battle Over Net Rules, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 18, 2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052970203735304577167331129343336.html
(Former White House Press Secretary, Joe Lockhart, works for Facebook, and former
counsel to John McCain, Pablo Chavez, for Google).
261 Online Protection and Enforcement of Digital Trade Act H.R. 3782, 112th Cong.
(2012) [hereinafter The OPEN Act].
262 David A. Fahrenthold, SOFA Protests Shut Down Websites, WASH. POST (Jan. 17,
2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/sopa-protests-to-shut-down-web-sites
/2012/01/17/gIQA4WYI6Pstory.html.
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January, with a vote on the bill less than a week away, opponents
mobilized the public through an e-legislating campaign. The plan for
the campaign had been months in the hatching. Mark Zuckerberg,
chief executive of Facebook, said, "The world today needs political
leaders who are pro-Internet. We have been working with many of
these folks for months on better alternatives to these current
proposals."2 64
First, the opponents posted information on their websites alerting
users to their concerns about SOPA. One site, Tumblr, hosted a "Stop
Censorship" day and helped generate over 87,000 phone calls to U.S.
Representatives on a single day.26 5 But no legislators were yet
abandoning the bill, and SOPA was scheduled to go for a vote.
So then, the SOPA opponents rolled out their "Nuclear Option," 2 66
a coordinated blackout on January 18, 2012. Jimmy Wales, the
founder of Wikipedia, threatened the blackout over a month ahead
saying:
Right now, what I'm thinking is that if there is credible threat that
[SOPA might pass], this [blackout] could have a positive impact on
the thinking of some legislators .

. .

. Do not underestimate our

power-in my opinion, they are terrified of a public uprising about
this, and we are uniquely positioned to start that.267
The story illustrates the Internet's agility, as vast numbers of
supporters of the SOPA opponents responded worldwide to the
protest.268 Wikipedia, the sixth largest website in the United States269
263 Paul Kane, SOPA, PIPA Votes to be Delayed in House and Senate, WASH. POST
(Jan. 20, 2012 11:16 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/2chambers/post/sopa
-senate-vote-to-be-delayed-reid-announces/2012/01/20/gIQApRWVDQjblog.html.
264 Jenna Wortham, With Twitter, Blackouts and Demonstrations, Web Flexes Its
Muscle, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/19/technology
/protests-of-antipiracy-bills-unite-web.html?r-l&.
265 TUMBLR STAFF BLOG (Nov. 17, 2011), http://staff.tumblr.com/post/12930076128/a
-historic-thing. November 16, 2011 was dubbed "American Censorship Day." American
Censorship Day, AMERICANCENSORSHIP.ORG, http://americancensorship.org/ (last visited
July 15, 2013).
266 Declan McCullagh, SOPA Opponents May Go Nuclear and Other 2012 Predictions,
CNET.COM (Dec. 29, 2011, 4:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921_3-57349540-281
/sopa-opponents-may-go-nuclear-and-other-2012-predictions/.
267 Christopher Williams, Wikipedia Co-Founder Threatens Blackout Over Anti-Piracy
Law, THE TELEGRAPH (Dec. 13, 2011, 11:58 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology
/jimmy-wales/8953273/Wikipedia-co-founder-threatens-blackout-over-anti-piracy-law
.html.
268 A few objectors resorted to old-fashioned letter writing, including an open letter to
Congress from several well-known artists and performers. An Open Letter to Washington
from Artists and Creators, Jan. 17, 2012, availableat http://www.stopthewall.us/artists/.
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with twenty-five million visitors on a typical day,
completely
blacked out its English service. The landing page simply directed its
users to contact their representatives to protest SOPA. Over 160
million people viewed Wikipedia's banner.271 Reddit and an
estimated 7000 smaller websites also joined in the service
blackout.2 72
While other websites did not completely deny service, many, such
as Google, Yahoo, Facebook, and Twitter, used their online platforms
to spread warnings and disseminate protest plans. The results were
dramatic: ten million petition signatures were collected, eight million
phone calls were attempted, 273 and four million emails were sent. 274
Google, which had the widest reach with 153.4 million site visits each
month in 2011,275 alone collected over seven million signatures.276
And yes, this e-legislating campaign had impact even though
members of Congress may not have known how many of these
millions of responses were from plebers or international interests
rather than from their constituents. In a dramatic turnaround,
members of Congress, including some of the initial sponsors, shelved
SOPA and PIPA indefinitely. 277 At the beginning of the day, the odds
269 Bill Killed: SOPA Death Celebratedas Congress Recalls Anti-Piracy Acts, RT.COM
(Jan. 20, 2012, 9:33 PM), http://rt.com/news/sopa-postponed-anonymous-piracy-337/.
270 Jimmy Wales, @JIMMYWALES (Jan. 16, 2012, 9:18 AM), available at How Many

People Saw the SOPA Blackout?, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 20, 2012, 11:03 PM),
http://www.economist.com/node/21005042/2012/01/web-statistics.?page=2.
271 Jimmy Wales, supra note 270.
272 The January18 Blackout/ Strike, supra note 254.
273 Demand was so heavy that the switchboard went down and calls could not be
completed. Wortham, supra note 264.
274 The January 18 Blackout / Strike, supra note 254. Some groups even resorted to
guerilla warfare tactics. After a government crackdown on the website Megaupload, which
hosts up to fifty million users a day, a "hacktivist" Internet group known as Anonymous
waged online attacks against several SOPA proponents, including the Department of
Justice, the RIAA, and Warner Music. Anonymous allegedly hacked their websites and
shut them down for extended periods. Philiana Ng, Hacktivist Group Anonymous Takes
Down Government, Music Industry Websites, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Jan. 19, 2012,
4:24 PM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/megaupload-anonymous-mpaa-riaa
-Websites-hacked-283427.
275 Brandon Russell, Google Amassed 153.4 Million U.S. Visitors Per Month in 2011,
TECHNOBUFFALO (Dec. 28, 2011), www.technobuffalo.com/2011/12/28/google-amassed
-153-4-million-u-s-visitors-per-month-in-201 1.
276 Bill Killed, supra note 269. Electronic Frontier Foundation, a U.S.-based
international digital rights advocacy nonprofit also claims it sent over 1 million e-mails on
January 18. Id.
277 Alan Fram, Web World Surprisedby Political Victory on Anti-PiracyBills, DENVER
POST (Jan. 22, 2012, 1:00 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/search/ci-19792107. See also
Jim Puzzanghera, SOPA Blackout: Bills Lose Three Co-Sponsors Amid Protests, L.A.

2013]

E-Legislating

67

in favor of passing the bill were two to one; by the end of the day,
almost every representative was aligned against it.278
As lawmakers fled from the bill in response to the backlash, SOPA
sponsor Representative Lamar Smith announced that any vote on the
bill would be delayed until they could reach a broader consensus. 279
"I have heard from the critics and I take seriously their concerns ....
It is clear that we need to revisit the approach," Smith explained.28 0
As of this writing more than a year later, Congress has still not
entertained any similar legislation.
B. The SOPA Protest in Light of the Five E-Legislating
Characteristics
This section will address each of the distinguishing characteristics
of e-legislating from Part III above in the context of the SOPA
protest.
1. Size and GeographicScope of the Internet
The SOPA protest illustrates the dramatic numbers that Internet
campaigns can generate. When the petition signatures, phone calls,
and emails were all tallied, the number of responses exceeded twentytwo million. This volume of virtual participants was overwhelming in
comparison to conventional citizen lobbying efforts-the switchboard
in Congress temporarily shut down from the overload. The next day,
Jimmy Wales of Wikipedia tweeted that "162 million worldwide saw

TIMES (Jan. 18, 2012, 10:19 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2012/01
/sopa-blackout-sopa-and-pipa-lose-three-co-sponsors-in-congress.html.
Senator Marco
Rubio posted his decision to withdraw his support on his Facebook page, explaining,
"[W]e've heard legitimate concerns about the impact the bill could have on access to the
Internet and about a potentially unreasonable expansion of the federal government's power
to impact the Internet. Congress should listen and avoid rushing through a bill that could
have many unintended consequences." Senator Marco Rubio, A Better Way to Fight the
Online Theft of American Ideas and Jobs, FACEBOOK (Jan. 18, 2012, 6:33 AM),

https://www.facebook.com/SenatorMarcoRubio/posts/340889625936408.
278 "By the end of the day, we had a huge swing in Congress ..... Bill Killed, supra
note 269. Electronic Frontier Foundation, a U.S.-based, international digital rights
advocacy nonprofit, claims to have sent over one million emails on January 18. See
Weisman, supra note 1.
279 Puzzanghera, supra note 258.
280 Roger Yu, Congress Shelves Anti-Piracy Bills, USA TODAY (Jan. 20, 2012, 2:38

PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/story/2012-01-20/anti-piracy-bills-halted
/52698192/1.
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the blackout page."281 According to Wales, only eight million of the
162 who viewed the page looked up congressional phone numbers.
This could mean that others who signed petitions or sent emails were
not American voters. In addition, there are no figures about how
many of the twenty-two million responses might have been from
plebers or super-plebers who submitted multiple responses from a
single email address.
2. Aspects ofInternet Speakers
It was easy to join the SOPA protest. The 100,000 websites that did
could unilaterally make the decision because they controlled the
platforms. Access was also cheap for them. Aside from the possible
loss of advertising revenue, they did not have to pay anything to
disperse their messages. They essentially enlisted their viewers as free
lobbyists.
While the entities urging the protests were known to their viewers,
anonymity could have played a role in the responses sent to Congress.
The Internet vehicle shields anyone who may have used fictitious
names from negative consequences. Further, there is no one-personone-vote restriction to prevent those who responded from submitting
multiple messages.
3. Type, Speed, and Quality ofInformation Received
The SOPA protest illustrates the alacrity of the Internet. The SOPA
opponents were able to -get their message out, to awaken their
followers to act, and to alarm legislators sufficiently to persuade them
to abandon the bill-all in a single day.
As with most lobbying information found on the Internet, the
quality of many of the messages on the day of the blackout was onesided and inflammatory. It is beyond the scope of this article to
describe what each of the 100,000 websites that participated
displayed, but Wikipedia's was one that had some of the broadest
reach. That webpage read: "Imagine a World Without Free
Knowledge . . . . Right now, the U.S. Congress is considering
legislation that could fatally damage the free and open Internet." 2 82
Although it is difficult to find multisensory videos of legislation,
the visual images the SOPA opponents posted helped achieve their
281 Jimmy Wales, @JIMMYWALES (Jan. 19, 2012, 12:54 AM), available at How Many
People Saw the SOPA Blackout?, supra note 270.
282 The January 18 Blackout / Strike, supra note 254.
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goal of invoking both fear and resentment. Wikipedia's website
featured a colorless image casting long, potentially ominous,
shadows. 283 Google's site and others posted large sections of redacted
words and spaces, and yet others stamped "Censored" across the
screen.
SOPA supporters countered, "The bill will not harm Wikipedia,
domestic blogs or social networking sites. This publicity stunt does a
disservice to its users by promoting fear instead of facts. Perhaps
during the blackout, Internet users can look elsewhere for an accurate
definition of online piracy."28 4 But these SOPA supporters needed to
make their points through traditional media because they did not have
access to Internet sources.
This illustrates an especially troubling aspect of the blackout:
SOPA opponents controlled access to information that citizens needed
to make an informed choice about the legislation. Major media and
entertainment companies who supported SOPA could not get their
message out. Critics complained that "[i]t's very difficult to counter
the misinformation when the disseminators also own the platform" 2 8 5
and that "[i]t is ironic that a website dedicated to providing
information is spreading misinformation about the Stop Online Piracy

Act." 2 86
and many of the other websites that
1 Google, Wikipedia,
participated are known for providing information, but on the day of
the protest, the quality of the messages from the SOPA opponents was
persuasive, not objective. They had tried earlier to educate and to
provide more specifics about the bill, but the choice had not been dire
or clear enough to exhort their followers into action. This time, the
message was clear. A caption beneath the black banner across
Google's page said, "Tell Congress: Please don't censor the web!" 2 87

283 Protests Against SOPA and PIPA, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki
/Wikipedia-blackout (last visited July 16, 2013).
284 Brendan Sasso, Sponsor of Online Piracy Bill Calls Wikipedia Blackout a
"Publicity Stunt," HILLICON VALLEY (Jan. 17, 2012, 4:30 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs
/hillicon-valley/technology/204629-gop-chairman-wikipedia-blackout-a-publicity-stunt
#ixzz2LDW1SjvS (quoting SOPA sponsor Lamar Smith).
285 Wortham, supra note 264 (quoting Cary H. Sherman, chairman and chief executive
of the Recording Industry Association of America, a trade group that represents the United
States music industry, referring to Google and Facebook).
286 Sasso, supranote 284.
287 Fahrenthold, supra note 262.

70

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92, 9

4. Type and Quality of Citizen Response
Some applauded the SOPA e-legislating campaign as a victory for
the people. "I think it is an important moment in the Capitol.

. .

. Too

often, legislation is about competing business interests. This is way
beyond that. This is individual citizens rising up."2 88 Others saw it as
the web opponents exercising their right to free speech, or something
akin to a union strike.2 89
Yet, still more saw it as a masterful lobbying strategy on the part of
the SOPA opponents:
It culminates a surprising lobbying effort in which technology
companies such as Twitter, Wikipedia and Google have used their
massive reach into Americans' daily lives as a political weapon, to
whip up support from online users. . . . In back offices of the

Senate, many longtime aides were amazed at how quickly a new
had managed to outmaneuver experienced
lobbying force
heavyweights. 290
SOPA did represent a battle of heavyweights-large media and
manufacturing companies against large web companies. Each side
had the money and firepower to play the traditional lobbying game in
Congress. The "old economy" mustered "campaign contributions,
Washington parties and high-priced lobbyists," but "nothing could
compare to the tentacles the new economy [could] reach into
Americans' everyday lives through sites like Wikipedia."291
The suggestion that the SOPA battle was just an extension of
lobbying-as-usual may tarnish the David v. Goliath image of elegislating. Were Internet users just another unpaid arm of the web
opponents' lobbying efforts when their traditional paid lobbyists had
failed? Were we just unwitting pawns in this battle of titans? This
result would be consistent with early studies which found that "the
Internet has not become a force for democratizing policy decisions . .
In fact, there is preliminary evidence that the Internet is

288 Weisman, supra note I (quoting Representative Zoe Lofgren, a Democrat from
California who opposed the legislation).
289 Melissa Bell, Web Strike Goes Back to the Future, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 2012, at
EZ5. See also Internet Goes on Strike, AMERICANCENSORSHIP.ORG, http://american

censorship.org/modallsopastrikeoverlay.html (last visited July 16, 2013).
290 Fahrenthold, supra note 262.
291 Weisman, supra note 1.
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increasingly a tool of the powerful and entrenched rather than the new
and reform-minded."2 9 2
Our Founders wanted a deliberative decision process for enacting
legislation to encourage informed decision-making that adapted to
competing constituent preferences or to legal and organizational
constraints. 293 There is no empirical data on what those who
contacted their legislators were thinking on January 18, 2012.
However, it was unlikely that even a fraction of the millions who
contacted their legislators had read and fully understood the seventyeight-page SOPA bill. Nor is it likely that most of the responses were
deliberative, informed, and adapted to competing preferences or
constraints.
294
It is possible that some read the posts of Zuckerberg and others
and were persuaded to contact their legislators because of groupframed preferences. We might ask, however, why we should feel a
closer affiliation with the SOPA opponent groups than with the
traditional media proponents of SOPA who were trying to save
American jobs by fighting counterfeiting and piracy. Considering the
fear and outrage techniques described above, impulse may have been
the primary motivating factor.
Finally, and perhaps most sinisterly, the SOPA opponents had the
ability to deprive users of their services as a means of motivating
them to act politically. The question became "how to translate the
inevitable confusion and outrage from those who don't know what
SOPA is into activism.... [There is] a great possibility to focus and
direct that energy [due to people's frustration about unavailability of
social media] into productive activism against SOPA." 2 95 Thus, the
Internet companies that opposed SOPA had a tool that few elegislating campaigns enjoy. By denying their viewers access, they
opened up some of those viewers' free time. They were then able to
292 R. Karl Rethemeyer, Policymaking in the Age ofInternet: Is the Internet Tending to
Make Policy Networks More or Less Inclusive?, 17 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 259,

279 (2006).
293 See, e.g., Rulemaking vs. Democracy, supra note 45, at 134 (defining "informed

preferences" as those "based on exposure to, and consideration of, reasonable full and
accurate factual information" and "adaptive preferences," meaning those that are
"informed preferences modified by an assessment of the larger social-political
environment, legal and organizational constraints, and the claims -of competing
preferences," etc.-i.e., "what is workable over what is ideal").
294 Wortham, supra note 264 (quoting Mark Zuckerberg's Facebook page).
295 Graeme McMillan, SOPA: What if Google, Facebook and Twitter Went Offline in

Protest?, TIME TECH (Jan. 5, 2012), http://techland.time.com/2012/01/05/sopa-what-if
-google-facebook-and-twitter-went-offline-in-protest/.
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divert that newfound time into activism that promoted the website's
political message.
Does this deprivation to coerce political action violate any laws?
The Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act prohibit persons from
attempting to "threaten, intimidate, or coerce" another person for the
purpose of interfering with that person's right to vote or to vote as he
or she may choose in an election. 296 Threats to deprive former slaves
of use of farms 297 or threats to prevent a black man from entering
property to conduct his job298 were both found to violate one of these
acts. Courts have also found that baseless arrests and prosecutions of
people for the purpose of denying them the right to vote or scaring
them from registering also violate 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971 and 1973.299
Similarly, threatening to deprive employees of their jobs if they do
not vote for a particular candidate is illegal under some state
statutes. 30 0 "About half of Americans live in jurisdictions that protect
296 Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§1973-1973b (2012); Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 197f (2012). To win a claim, a plaintiff must satisfy two requirements: (1)
showing that there was an intimidation, threat, or coercion, or an attempt to intimidate,
threaten or coerce, and (2) that the intimidation was for the purpose of interfering with the
right to vote. United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734, 740 (5th Cir. 1967).
297 United States v. Beaty, 288 F.2d 653, 654 (6th Cir. 1961). In United States v. Beaty,
white landowners evicted or threatened to evict blacks of voting age from the farms where
they lived and worked as sharecroppers as a means to punish or prevent blacks from
registering to vote. The Court labeled the practice "economic strangulation" and held that
it violated 42 U.S.C. § 1971(b)'s prohibition on "threats, intimidation, or coercion." Id. at
656. The court also noted the fact that the landowners' "coercion relate[d] to land or
contracts would furnish no excuse or defense." Id. Note that Beaty deals with the Civil
Rights Act, which is based on race, but the spirit and language of that act is sufficiently
similar to the Voting Rights Act to translate to the VRA as well. Id.
298 United States v. Bruce, 353 F.2d 474, 476 (5th Cir. 1965). The court in United
States v. Bruce also dealt with exertions of power over a man's profession as a means of
improper coercion under § 1971. In Bruce, landowners denied a black man the right to
enter their property, and in so doing prevented him from performing his job of collecting
the money for their insurance policy premiums. The court held that, even though it is
perfectly legal to exclude another from one's private property, the exclusion was
nevertheless illegal under § 1971 because the exclusion, which affected the man's
livelihood, was coercion for the purpose of interfering with his right to register to vote. Id.
at 477; see also McLeod, 385 F.2d at 740 ("Acts otherwise entirely within the law may
violate the statute if they have the proscribed effect and purpose.").
299 McLeod, 385 F.2d at 734; City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 847 (1966).
300 Some state laws may prohibit companies taking action to influence how their
employees vote. David A. Graham, Can Your Boss Threaten to Fire You if You Don't Vote
for Romney?, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 20, 2012 10:00 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com
/politics/archive/2012/10/can-your-boss-threaten-to-fire-you-if-you-dont-vote-for-romney
/263709/#. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE, § 1102 (West 2012) ("No employer shall coerce or
influence or attempt to coerce or influence his employees through or by means of threat of
discharge or loss of employment to adopt or follow or refrain from adopting or following
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some private employee speech or political activity from employer
retaliation.,, 0 ' However, if properly worded, such threats do not
appear to violate federal law, which explains why several CEOs who
made threats to their employees at Presidential Candidate Romney's
302
urging could do so without legal repercussions.
any particular course or line of political action or political activity."); OR. REV. STAT. §
260.665 (2012) ("(1) As used in this section, "undue influence" means force, violence,
restraint or the threat of it, inflicting injury, damage, harm, loss of employment or other
loss or the threat of it, or giving or promising to give money, employment or other thing of
value. (2) A person, acting either alone or with or through any other person, may not
directly or indirectly subject any person to undue influence with the intent to induce any
person to: (a) register or vote; (d) be . . . a candidate; or (i) sign or refrain from signing a
prospective petition or an initiative, referendum, [or] recall.").
301 Eugene Volokh, Private Employees' Speech and Political Activity: Statutory
ProtectionAgainst Employer Retaliation, 16 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 295, 297 (2012).

302 During the 2012 campaign, Mitt Romney urged employers:
I hope you make it very clear to your employees what you believe is in the best
interest of your enterprise and therefore their job and their future in the upcoming
elections .

. .

. Nothing illegal about you talking to your employees about what

you believe is best for the business, because I think that will figure into their
election decision, their voting decision and of course doing that with your family
and your kids as well.
Josh Voorhees, Romney Wants Small Business Owners to Tell Their Employees How They

Should Vote, SLATE.COM (OCT. 18, 2012, 10:40 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the
_slatest/2012/10/18/romney-s.nfib-call-gop-hopefultells-employers-totell-employees
who to.html. Several employers followed up by threatening employees that their jobs
would be on the line if Obama was reelected. Adam Peck, CEO ThreatensEmployees With
'PersonalConsequences' If Romney Loses, THINKPROGRESS.COM (Oct. 25, 2012, 1:35

PM),

http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2012/10/25/1089891/ceo-consequences-romney

/?mobile-nc; Alexis Kleinman, Nine CEOs Pushing Workers to Vote for Romney,

HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 28, 2012, 12:30 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10
/28/ceos-urge-employees-vote-romney-n_2018264.html; Larry Gold, associate general
counsel of the AFL-CIO, opined that such threats crossed the line into improper coercion
or intimidation of voters into voting a certain way. Steven Greenhouse, Here's a Memo
From the Boss: Vote This Way, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com
/2012/10/27/us/politics/bosses-offering-timely-advice-how-to-vote.html?pagewanted=all
&r-0.
Larry Gold, associate general counsel of the A.F.L.-C.I.O., said some of the
recent employer letters, by hinting at the possible loss of employees' jobs,
appeared to cross the line into improper coercion. Federal law and the laws of
several states bar anyone from coercing or intimidating voters into voting a
certain way.
But Bradley A. Smith, a Republican former member of the Federal Election
Commission and a professor at Capital University Law School, disagreed, saying
letters like those sent by the companies were not firm threats to fire anyone if Mr.
Obama won.
"The concem here is there is an unavoidable power disparity between
management and employees," said Adam Skaggs, senior counsel at the liberal
Brennan Center for Justice. "Put yourself in the shoes of an employee at any of
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It is unlikely that the deprivation of Internet services that SOPA
opponents used on January 18, 2012, rises to the level of an illegal
act. The Internet is not a necessary service, and the deprivation was
not intended to influence voting in an election, which is the scope of
the statutes. However, using deprivation to manipulate and motivate
political action is disturbing. "Mr. Dodd said Internet companies
might well change Washington, but not necessarily for the better with
or
their ability to spread their message globally, without regulation
303
yourselves."'
'Brace
added.
he
day,'
new
a
'It's
fact checking.
5. Impact
Despite the emotion and inability to verify whether constituents or
non-citizens were speaking, members of Congress were so
overwhelmed by the one-day deluge of protests against SOPA that
they fled from it in droves. Thus, this campaign proved that elegislating has the ability to stop legislation. The question remains
whether it also can be effective as a constructive mechanism for the
creation of laws.
I .
An often overlooked part of the SOPA blackout story is that the
Internet protest translated to some actual physical turnout in San
Francisco and New York. However, in comparison to the millions
who responded online, the real-world turnout was relatively meager.
About a thousand protestors flocked into Midtown Manhattan.304 But
only around one hundred people showed up for a rally at City Hall in
San Francisco.os Another rally planned in Seattle was postponed due
306
to rain.
These numbers are paltry in comparison to those for the
first Earth Day in 1970. Mayor John Lindsay shut down Fifth Avenue
those companies. Are you going to be comfortable putting an Obama bumper
sticker on your car and driving into the company parking lot? If you're in a small
community with a big employer, will you feel uncomfortable about putting up a
yard sign for a candidate your boss doesn't favor?"
Id.
303 Weisman, supra note 1. "Mr. Smith, the House Republican author, said opposition
Web sites were spreading 'fear rather than fact.' 'When the opposition is based upon
misinformation, I have confidence in the facts and confidence that the facts will ultimately
prevail,' Mr. Smith said." Id.
304 Wortham, supra note 264.
305 Sarah Mitroff, Silicon Valley Luminaries Protest SOPA

in Downtown San

Francisco, VBNEWS (Jan. 18, 2012, 2:39 PM), http://venturebeat.com/2012/01/18/sopa
-san-francisco-protest/.
306 Wortham, supra note 264. Stop SOPA in Seattle: Microsoft,Amazon, Geekwire, and

a Rally, SEATTLE Pi (Jan. 18, 2012), http://blog.seattlepi.com/seattlewaterfronthomes
/2012/01/18/stop-sopa-in-seattle-microsoft-amazon-geekwire-and-a-rally/.
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as a crowd of approximately one million demonstrated in Central
Park,30 7 and nationwide, an estimated twenty million participated in
peaceful teach-ins to persuade politicians to enact substantial and
lasting environmental legislation.
Although it may be true that "pressure works," 309 a virtual
revolution may be confined to the virtual world until it generates
some boots on the ground. It is easier for a legislator to ignore a
virtual presence of one million electronic letters than a mob of one
million angry constituents outside the office door. E-legislating may
need to get people into the streets to be effective, but Revolution 2.0
showed that social media may just be up to that task.
CONCLUSION

Congress can no longer escape the impact of e-legislating. Interest
groups have recognized its potential and are engaged in an escalating
310
Consequently, we must all
arms race for virtual participants.
become aware of e-legislating's positive attributes and its drawbacks.
E-legislating's success in thwarting Congress's efforts to pass the
Stop Online Piracy Act provides a valuable illustration.
The SOPA experience may have exaggerated the problems because
of the players and the issue. Yet, it provides valuable lessons about
the potential vulnerabilities of the e-legislating process in general.
Most importantly, how can we avoid manipulation of average
citizens? The SOPA opponents were in the unique position of being
able both to create citizen outrage through deprivation and fear and to
harness into lobbying action the additional time created by taking
away Internet entertainment. In addition, the SOPA situation
highlighted the ability of the Internet to allow the lightning-fast
spread of misinformation, while corrections never receive the same
penetration or coverage. 311
307 See EPA History: Earth Day, EPA, http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/epa-history-earth

-day (last updated June 19, 2013).
308 EARTH DAYS (PBS television broadcast, Zeitgeist Films 2010), available at
http://video.pbs.org/video/1463378089/. See also ENVIROLINK, http://earthday.envirolink
.org/history.html (last visited July 17, 2013).
309 Rachel Maddow Show (NBC television broadcast Jan. 30, 2013) (discussing
Organizing for Action).
310 Fred Emery & Andrew Emery, A Modest Proposal: Improve E-Rulemaking by
Improving Comments, 31 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 8 (2005) (referring to a "rulemaking
arms race").
311 Jon Stewart mocked how little coverage studies reaffirming climate change by
previous skeptics received compared to that of the McDonald's McRib sandwich on The
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Furthermore, the SOPA experience illustrated only the ability of elegislating to stop congressional action. It does not illustrate success
in achieving positive action-actually getting statutes enacted. Vested
interests have always screamed the loudest when opposing change, so
does e-legislating just give these interests a larger megaphone? Or can
the virtual pressure translate to a true turnout of activists as in Egypt?
The flexibility and speed of the Internet allow more close monitoring
of Congress so average citizens can respond at critical times in the
legislative process. But how can we keep people focused to carry
through and maintain pressure at every stage of what our Founders
intentionally created as a complex, deliberative legislative process?
This may be the challenge of our time. Can we be persistent as the
process requires, or does the quick and fleeting attention span of the
Internet make this especially challenging?
E-legislating has the potential for leveling the playing field for
average citizens who have in the past been competing with privileged
interests who can afford full-time lobbyists. If we can harness this
positive change, then the "new day" in Washington will be a sunny
one.

Daily Show. Jon Stewart Rips Media for Ignoring 'Climategate' Debunking, Covering
McRib Instead, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 27, 2011, 10:51 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/2011/10/27/jon-stewart-climategate-debunkin-media-mcrib_n_1034792.html.

